The distribution of corporate control depends on the comparative specificity of the factors of production that form the corporation as a company and on how the enterprise’s activity planning is structured . While physical capital, or a significant part of it, almost always represents specific investments, other factors of production may specialize to a greater or lesser extent, that is, become specific, depending on a number of reasons, which include, for example, technological features production process, the information structure of company, corporate culture, marketing plan, state of the markets relevant production factors, that mechanisms interests n stavschikov specific factors are not the owners of the company, and so on. n.
Taking into account the ability of economic agents to influence the political process, it can be assumed that marketing planning in the matter of choosing suppliers of financial resources and organizing relationships with them, the management of companies will direct to ensure their own interests, including by influencing regulatory bodies and legal norms.
Based on this assumption, we turn to the features of the modern Russian economy and Russian enterprises.
Among the characteristic features of the Soviet economy, which was largely inherited by the Russian economy, were peculiar and unique in size structural and industry imbalances, centralized planning of the enterprise. All this was combined with the bureaucratization of industrial management, egalitarianism, and the absence of effective mechanisms for stimulating workers. Perhaps, almost everyone in the mid-80s realized the hopelessness of such a direction of development. The need for deep transformation was both at the micro level, where the basic planning of the enterprise’s activity takes place, and at the macro level, which implied a structural transformation of the country's economy as a whole. But the structural reorganization of the economy was a very large-scale problem, the solution of which was associated with political stability, which was absent in the country. Therefore, it is not surprising that the authors of the reforms chose to focus on the reform of the formal side of property relations, hoping that it would become a catalyst for structural changes.
The result of this approach was a dynamically developing contradiction between the structural parameters of the country's economy and the attempts to “push” it towards the transition to market planning of the enterprise. This was especially pronounced in the sectors with the highest level of monopolization, narrow specialization, and technologically backward ones. The fact is that the human capital of these industries is actually a specific factor of production. The termination of its interaction with other factors, the closure of firms will lead to the fact that most workers will be unable to find work, that is, they will not be able to realize their human capital. Meanwhile, the attraction of financing by these enterprises is possible only on condition that the capital supplier establishes control over them and further deep restructuring, since in their current state these enterprises cannot be profitable.
At the same time, the state inevitably needs to assume the role of the main intermediary in the economy in order to neutralize the negative consequences of the distorted structure of the economy and financial flows in it, to stimulate the transition to modern market development strategies.