Alexey Isaev calls himself the last humanist of the gallant century. He became a famous domestic historian, a candidate of historical sciences. He maintains his blog “The Last Humanist of the Gallant Century” and opposes the genre of folk history.
Biography
The future author of books on the Great War, Alexei Isaev, was born in Tashkent on August 15, 1974. He graduated from the Cybernetics Department of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute. He was an employee of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
In 2012, having defended his dissertation, he became a candidate of historical sciences. Subsequently, he became the author of prefaces to memoirs, many books, articles in The Last Humanist of the Gallant Century and newspapers.
He developed an interest in history after watching the film “Hot Snow” in his youth. Acquainted with the Russian historian M.N. Svirin, he began working in the archive in the early 2000s. In 2001, he began writing books. From the very beginning, Alexei Isaev wrote about the war. He became famous for criticizing the theory of V. Suvorov. This is how the later famous book by Isaev Aleksey Valerievich Antisuvorov appeared.
Books
In his works, the researcher prefers to cover the hostilities that took place during the Second World War. So, the most famous books by Isaev Aleksey Valerievich were research on Georgy Zhukov. His most popular works are “June 22 - May 9. The Great Patriotic War ”,“ Stalingrad. Beyond the Volga there is no land for us ”,“ The main myths about the Second World War ”,“ Invasion. June 22, 1941 ”and many others.
About sources
It is noteworthy that in the study of history, Aleksei Valerievich Isaev relies on many primary sources, which include both foreign and Russian archives. Thanks to this, he achieves objectivity and impartiality. In addition, the historian sometimes issues reviews of some works, emphasizing the absence or presence of historicity in them. He reveals many artistic exaggerations that many perceive as historical truth.
Historical research on WWII
Sometimes it seems that everything was already told about the Second World War, and 76 years after the historical invasion it is hardly possible to learn anything new. Nevertheless, a researcher in historical archives claims that much of the published is not true. So, the reasons for the defeat of the Soviet troops in the first days of the invasion of the Wehrmacht troops are absolutely wrongly indicated.
The generally accepted point of view is the view that Soviet troops were defeated at the beginning of hostilities due to the fact that the aircraft were destroyed by the enemy on the ground. This is often shown in the movies. But in reality this is a myth. Soviet aircraft could not take off due to the fact that most of the airfields were open. Not an hour later, domestic aviation was destroyed. It was destroyed within 3 days. Bases in advance were revealed by Germans and bombed with their exact blows. There were a small number of airfields from which planes took off, giving a worthy rebuff, but the forces were not equal.
The fact is that in those days it was necessary to reconstruct airfields. And during the summer of 1941 it was planned to reconstruct many of them. As a result, in June, most of the runways were plowed up. In addition, equipment and tankers were at reconstructed bases. And the planes that managed to take off and go back did not have time to fill the tanks with fuel after the fighting - they were bombed. Therefore, the stories that there were traitors in the manual are a myth.
Reasons for reconstruction
It would seem illogical to start such a project before the war. But in May 1941, when it began, nothing portended trouble. Myths are widespread that scouts warned Stalin many times that an attack on the USSR was being prepared. But in reality, no one had serious analytics. The Germans carefully concealed preparations for the invasion. The concentration of German troops in the east was explained by a defensive barrier before landing in England. And many connections advanced to the Soviet borders at the last moment. For these reasons, scouts did not identify serious threats. And the note of comrade Tupikov from Berlin, sent in April, was lost in the general information flow. She spoke about Germany ’s plans to attack the USSR, but exact dates were not indicated there. It was noted that the attack would take place in the same year.
About the scenario of war
If this information were taken more seriously, the reconstruction of airfields would be postponed. And the war would have unfolded differently. The forecast would be more favorable for the USSR, and the war could get stuck near the Dnieper. But what happened in the end is not the worst-case scenario of the war. And, according to Isaev, it would be much worse if the Soviet leadership did not take instant measures.
About measures
In The Last Humanist of the Gallant Century, Isaev points out that the fact that Stalin pulled away from command in the early days of the war is just a rumor. In the first hours, he set about hard work. He took up the techniques of senior management in the military and industrial fields. At that moment, the most important decisions were made. So, it was decided to abandon the pre-war mobilization plan. Evacuation was started in advance.
New divisions were instantly formed. So, Panfilov’s 316th division was formed already in July. It was calculated in advance that German troops would reach Moscow at such a pace. But the city could not be lost, since it was the main transport hub of the country. And then they began to form the 300th and 400th divisions. If they were created at least a month later, time would have been lost, and the fate of France would have awaited the country - a complete defeat.
The myth is also widespread that many officers were repressed by the authorities, and if this had not been done, the forecast for the country would be more favorable. But Isaev claims that this is a myth. So, before the start of World War II, only 4% of officers were arrested. And this to a small extent influenced the combat effectiveness of the army.
The outcome of the battles of the first days was predetermined in advance, since on June 22, 1941 only 40 Soviet formations were combat-ready, and they were attacked by more than 100 fascist divisions. And any alignment would lead to the same outcome.
The inventions of the intelligentsia are the opinion that the fear of the NKVD bodies forced the Soviet leadership to make many mistakes. The officers did not experience such fear. They sometimes completely ignored the direct instructions given from above, doing what was necessary in specific circumstances in wartime conditions. These were people of a completely different core, and fear did not affect their decisions.
Alexey Isaev believes that the most dangerous myth is that the country's leadership abandoned the fighters, and the commanders betrayed the soldiers. In reality, everything was completely different.
About unknown heroes
Isaev notes that there are many heroic examples that became unknown due to the fact that the Red Army soldiers taking part in the events eventually died. So, in the Vladimir-Volyn fortified area, the actions of the Red Army forced the Germans to change their initial plans and distribution of forces altogether. Resistance here was broken only in the morning of June 23. The Soviet fighters who fought here simply did not survive in order to report about themselves, having fallen into the "Kiev Cauldron".
And in the description of the battle near Sokal, the Germans themselves described how the attack of just one Soviet bunker took about 3 hours. The Germans admitted that "the Russian soldiers put up outstanding resistance, surrendering only if they were wounded, because they fought to the last opportunity."