Strategic planning of military operations is carried out by army headquarters on the basis of several fundamental premises. These include an indispensable condition for command awareness of the operational situation and the uninterrupted exchange of information. If either of these two criteria is not met, even the most powerful army in the world, armed with a huge amount of modern equipment and staffed with selected soldiers, turns into a helpless crowd, laden with piles of scrap metal. The receipt and transmission of information is currently carried out by means of reconnaissance, detection and communication. Every strategist dreams of disabling the enemy radar and destroying his communications. This can be done by means and methods of electronic warfare (EW).
Early electronic countermeasures
As soon as electronics appeared, it began to be used by defense departments. The advantages of the wireless communications invented by Popov were instantly appreciated by the imperial Russian Navy. During the First World War, on-air reception and transmission of information became commonplace. Then the first methods of electronic warfare appeared, which are still timid and not very effective. To create interference, airplanes and airships dropped cut aluminum foil from above, creating obstacles to the passage of radio waves. Of course, this method had many disadvantages, it did not last long and did not completely block the communication channel . In the years 1914-1918, another important electronic warfare technique, which has been widespread in our time, has spread. The tasks of signalmen and scouts included intercepting enemy broadcasts. Information was learned to encrypt very quickly, but even an assessment of the degree of intensity of the radio exchange allowed staff analysts to judge a lot.
The role of information in World War II
After the outbreak of World War II, electronic warfare entered a new phase of development. The power of submarines and aircraft of Nazi Germany required an effective confrontation. In Britain and the USA, countries facing the security problem of Atlantic communications, serious work has begun on the creation of early warning means for surface and air targets, in particular, bombers and FAA missiles. There was also a sharp question about the possibility of decrypting messages from German submariners. Despite the impressive work of mathematical analysts and the presence of some achievements, electronic warfare became effective only after capturing Engim's (random) secret machine. The real value of research in the field of misinformation and interruption of the information structure of Germany during the Second World War was not found, but experience was accumulating.
Army as a living organism
During the Cold War, electronic warfare equipment began to take shape that was close to the modern understanding of them. Armed forces, if compared to a living organism, possess sensory organs, a brain and power organs that directly carry out fire impact on the enemy. The “ears” and “eyes” of the army are means of observation, detection and recognition of objects that can pose a threat to the security of a tactical or strategic level. The brain function is carried out by headquarters. From it through the thin "nerves" of the communication channels to the military units receive orders that are binding. Various measures are being taken to protect this entire complex system, but it remains vulnerable. First, the enemy always seeks to disrupt control by destroying headquarters. His second goal is to hit the means of information support (radar and early warning posts). Thirdly, if the communication channels are broken, the control system loses its functionality. A modern electronic warfare system goes beyond these three tasks and often works much more complicated.
Defense asymmetry
It is no secret that the US military budget in monetary terms is many times greater than the Russian one. To successfully confront a possible threat, our country has to take asymmetric measures, providing the proper level of security with less costly means. The effectiveness of protective equipment is determined by high-tech solutions that create the technical conditions for causing the most damage to the aggressor by concentrating efforts on his vulnerable areas.
In the Russian Federation, one of the leading organizations involved in the development of electronic warfare is KRET (Concern Radioelectronic Technologies). The basis for creating means of suppressing the activity of a potential adversary is a certain philosophical concept. For successful operation, the system must determine priority areas of work at various stages of the development of the military conflict.
What is non-energy interference
At the present stage, the creation of universal interference, completely eliminating information exchange, is almost impossible. A much more effective countermeasure can be a signal interception, its interpretation and transmission to the enemy in a distorted form. Such a system of electronic warfare creates an effect that has received the name “non-energy interference” from specialists. Its action can lead to a complete disorganization of the management of hostile armed forces, and, as a consequence, to their complete defeat. This method, according to some reports, has already been used during the Middle East conflicts, but in the late sixties and early seventies the electronic base of electronic warfare equipment did not allow achieving high efficiency. Intervention in the process of controlling the enemy’s military units was carried out “in manual mode”. Today, the Russian electronic warfare units have digital technologies at their disposal.
Tactical Tools
In addition to strategic issues, the troops at the forefront are forced to solve tactical tasks. Aircraft must fly over enemy positions protected by air defense systems. Is it possible to provide them with unhindered passage over defensive lines? The episode that took place during the naval exercises in the Black Sea (April 2014), practically proves that modern Russian electronic warfare systems provide a high probability of invulnerability of aircraft, even if their characteristics today are no longer among the most advanced.
The Department of Defense modestly refrains from commenting, but the reaction of the American side says a lot. The usual - in terms of maneuvers - flying around the Donald Cook ship with an unarmed Su-24 bomber led to the failure of all guidance equipment. So the small-sized electronic warfare complex "Khibiny" operates.
The Khibiny complex
This system, named after the ridge on the Kola Peninsula, externally is a cylindrical container suspended on a standard pylon of a military aircraft. The idea of creating a means of information counteraction arose in the second half of the seventies. The defense topic was obtained by KNIRTI (Kaluga Research Institute of Radio Engineering). The electronic warfare complex conceptually consisted of two units, one of which (Proran) was responsible for reconnaissance functions, and the other (Regatta) exposed active interference. The work was successfully completed in 1980.
The modules were intended for installation on a front-line fighter Su-27. The Khibiny Russian electronic warfare system was the result of combining the functions of both units and ensuring their coordinated work together with the aircraft's onboard equipment.
Purpose of the complex
The L-175V device (“Khibiny”) is designed to perform several functions, which are defined as radio-electronic suppression of the activity of enemy air defense systems.
The first task that he had to solve in combat conditions was to detect the probing signal of the radiation source. Then, the received signal is distorted in order to make it difficult to detect a carrier aircraft. In addition, the device creates the conditions for the appearance of false targets on the radar screen, complicates the determination of range and coordinates, and worsens other recognition indicators.
The problems arising from enemy air defense systems are becoming so widespread that there is no need to talk about the effectiveness of their work.
Modernization of the Khibiny complex
During the time that has passed since the adoption of the L-175V product, the device layout has undergone numerous changes aimed at increasing the technical parameters and reducing weight and size. Improvement continues today, the subtleties are kept secret, but it is known that the latest electronic warfare complex can carry out group defense of aircraft from the effects of anti-aircraft missile systems of a potential enemy, both existing and promising. The modular design implies the possibility of increasing power and information capabilities, depending on the requirements of the tactical environment. When developing the device, not only the current state of the air defense systems of the probable enemy was taken into account, but also the anticipation of their development opportunities in the near future (for the period until 2025).
The mysterious "Beauty"
The electronic warfare troops of the Russian Federation have recently been armed with four mobile systems of the electronic warfare Krasukha-4. They are secret, in spite of the fact that the land-based stationary systems of a similar purpose “Krasukha-2” have already been in operation in military units since 2009.
It is known that mobile complexes were created by the Rostov Scientific Research Institute Gradient, are produced by the Nizhny Novgorod NPO Kvant and mounted on a BAZ-6910-022 chassis (four-axle, cross-country). By its principle of operation, the latest Russian electronic warfare complex “Krasukha” is an active-passive system combining the possibility of re-emission of electromagnetic fields generated by early warning antennas (including AWACS) and the creation of active directional interference. The lack of technical details did not prevent the media from leaking information about the amazing capabilities of the electronic warfare complex, whose work is driving the control systems of unmanned aerial vehicles and missile guidance missiles of a potential enemy crazy.
What is hidden behind a veil of secrecy
For obvious reasons, information about the technical characteristics of the latest Russian electronic countermeasures systems is kept secret. Other countries are also in no hurry to share secrets in the field of such developments, which, of course, are underway. However, it is still possible to judge the degree of combat readiness of a particular defense equipment by indirect signs. Unlike nuclear strategic missiles, the effectiveness of which is better to guess and perform speculative analysis, the electronic warfare equipment can be tested in conditions that are closest to the military, and even against very real, albeit probable opponents, as happened in April 2014 year. So far, there is reason to believe that the Russian electronic warfare troops, in which case, will not fail.