Philosophy throughout history examines the issue of the ontological status of consciousness. Traditionally viewed by some as part of the main branch of philosophy known as metaphysics, ontology often deals with questions about which entities exist or are said to be “existent,” and how such entities can be grouped, connected within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences. Thus, their ontological status is determined.
Another branch of philosophy is ethics. How does it relate to the topic of the article? The fact is that ethics and ontology have common ground - for example, in questions about how to restore the ontological status of ethics.
Existence status
Some philosophers, especially in the traditions of the Platonic school, argue that all nouns (including abstract nouns) refer to existing entities. Other philosophers argue that nouns do not always refer to entities, but some provide a kind of abbreviation for referring to a group of objects or events. In this last point of view, the mind, instead of referring to the essence, refers to the totality of mental events experienced by man; society refers to the totality of people with some common characteristics, and geometry refers to the totality of specific types of intellectual activity. Between these poles of realism and nominalism there are various other positions that determine, among other things, the ontological status of consciousness.
In addition, the philosophers of antiquity were also lawyers, and naturalists, and chemists. Therefore, in the framework of the ontology, they considered such issues as the ontological status of law. Let's study these issues.
Ontological status of fact
A proposal is objective (that is, factual) if it is useful to others, independently of you as an observer. A sentence is subjective (that is, based on opinion) if it depends on you as an observer.
Scientific facts are facts that apply to the natural world. For example, “I wear white socks” may be a scientific fact, regardless of whether this statement is confirmed by repeated careful observation or measurement. Similarly, “I love chocolate ice cream” is a fact that can be stored in a demographic database.
On the contrary, “chocolate ice cream tastes good” is an opinion. “Good taste” is not an integral attribute of chocolate ice cream and depends on your perception as an observer.
Actual statements are intentions. The quality of concrete facts depends on the lack of intention to deceive and on reliability. Independent verification can increase the reliability and therefore the quality of the facts.
Definitions of Fact
Standard / generally accepted definitions of "fact" usually include a degenerate circular reference to "truth" (Definitions of fact - Search in OneLook dictionary, Definitions of truth - Search in OneLook dictionary); that is, “facts” are sentences that are true, and “truth” are sentences that are factual. Whatever the opinion of the person, the ontological status of the fact remains stable.
Since “objectivity” is a clear act of intention, your ability to be “truly objective” especially depends on your ability to completely get rid of the dependence on the usefulness of your objective judgments. If others find your objective suggestions useful without your participation as an observer, then for these people your objective suggestions are truly objective.
Ontology and Transcendence
As a potential fourth meaning of “truth,” it is possible that some people (that is, prophets) have magical, transcendental abilities to discern truths about reality; that is, the ability to remove all illusions and errors from his view of the natural world. For such people, facts may not be just an act of intent. Unfortunately, you must have the ability to judge them.
Speaking about the ontological status of mathematical objects, it is worth noting that in the “absolute abstraction” of mathematics, “truths” are neither subjective nor objective; they are simply theoretical: either declared and tautological, as in axioms and theorems, devoid of actual value, or declared and assumed, or generally accepted, as in definitions, again leading to a tautology in interpretation and application.
Ontological status of space and time
Having studied the basics of the special theory of relativity and condemned the Neolorentzian approach to time, we can understand that the meaningless theory of time is the best representative model of this proof. Moreover, from this point of view, the events of history themselves are just as real and as significant as this discussion. The assassination of John F. Kennedy is as real as the opening remarks of the 45th president of the United States. The ontological status of man is just as real.
From a physical point of view, if we assume that reality exists as it is perceived, then all the events that you perceive from the outside world (i.e. do not come from your own mind) are necessarily events of the past, since the maximum speed with which information can be distributed, the speed of light. This may seem like an inappropriate interjection, but it is simply because at the time you perceive the event, this exact event no longer occurs and, therefore, is no longer “real” in a tense state. From the point of view of ontology, past events exist in the same way as current ones; they exist simply as temporary points on a [perceived] linear timeline, not as a physical object, but as concepts used to describe the temporal nature of things at a given point.
Ontology of time
What else can be said about the ontological status of time and space? In philosophical discussions regarding the ontology of time, two different questions are usually distinguished. Is time an entity in its own right, or rather should it be seen as a combination of the relationships of sequence, simultaneity and duration that arise between fundamental entities called events or processes? Are the temporal relationships that arise between two events (in the case of simultaneity and sequence) or four events (in the case of duration) caused by an inertial reference system, or are they maintained independently of any such reference system?
For clarity, it is worth calling time, consisting only of sequences, simultaneities and durations, relative, in contrast to anti-relational or substantive time, conceived as an independently existing entity. On the other hand, time depending on the inertial reference frame will be called relativistic, and time independent of this should be called absolute. This terminology is proposed by faute de mieux, although it conflicts with other terminologies used in the discussion of time. But the difference mentioned in the proposed terminology is indeed independent of this terminology. A few historical examples may clarify this difference.
Works of art
The discussion of the ontological status of art can be summarized by the question of whether the works of art are substances or qualities. A substance is that which exists within and through itself. For example, a cat is a substance in the sense that it is not a quality of anything else and exists in itself as a separate entity. In contrast, the black, gray, orange, and brown colors of Tabby fur are quality because it does not have an independent existence. In the debate about fictions, the question is whether fictions exist independently, whether they are substances in their own right, or whether they are always and only qualities of other objects. For example, we could say that fictions can exist only in the mind, in which case they will be qualities, not substances. The status of works of art in many respects depends on the ontological status of consciousness.
Four recent turns (realistic, process, holistic and reflective) in social thought are discussed, related to the four-dimensional scheme of dialectical realism, which the author recently outlined. It is shown how ontology is important and really not only necessary, but also inevitable. The nature of the reality of ideas (of various types) is shown and the most common errors in the metatheory of ideas are analyzed. Then the importance of categorial realism and the nature of these specific types are discussed if ideas are known as “ideologies”. Finally, some good and bad dialectical connections of ideas and related phenomena are outlined. Thus, the ontological status of religion depends on the thinking of the observer (person). No matter how one thinks, such phenomena as religiosity, ideas, and imagination seem to have common roots.
Biology
Touching on the topic of the ontological status of health, we inevitably encounter the problem of a similar status of biological species. A reference to a species problem today may seem strange and vaguely anachronistic. Perhaps the species problem had some significance a long time ago in the philosophical debate between nominalists and essentialists, or a century ago in biology, when Darwin presented his theory of organic evolution, but it certainly does not represent any modern interest. But “species,” such as the terms “gene,” “electron,” “nonlocal simultaneity,” and “element,” are a theoretical term included in significant scientific theory. The nature of physical elements was once an important problem in physics. The transition from elements defined in terms of common features to specific gravity, molecular weight and atomic number was important for the development of atomic theory. The transition in biology from genes defined in terms of single characters, to the production of enzymes, to the coding of specific polypeptides, to structurally defined segments of nucleic acid was equally important for the growth of modern genetics. A similar transition occurs in relation to the concept of the species and is equally important.
Information ontology
Although the inclusion of theoretical concepts of information in (quantum) physics has been a huge success in recent years, the ontology of information remains a mystery. Therefore, this thesis is intended to contribute to the discussion about the ontological status of information in physics. Most of the recent debates have focused on syntactic informational measures and especially on Shannon’s information, a concept that originally arose from communication theory. This thesis includes another syntactic informational measure, a still largely unrepresented concept of “Algorithmic Information” or “Kolmogorov Complexity,” a concept often used in computer science. Shannon’s information and Kolmogorov’s complexity are connected using coding theory and have similar characteristics. By comparing Shannon’s information and Kolmogorov’s complexity, a structure has been developed that analyzes relevant informational measures regarding uncertainty and semantic information. In addition, this structure examines whether information can be considered an essential entity, and examines the extent to which information is generally accepted. The ontological status of technology, nature, being, and in general everything that relates to our reality depends on this.
It turns out that in the classical case, Shannon’s information and Kolmogorov’s complexity are both abstract and highly conditional entities, which should not be confused with uncertainty and not related to semantic information. Almost the same results were obtained in the quantum case, with the exception of a high degree of conditionality; it is argued that quantum theory limits the generally accepted choice of those who want to use any theory.
Translation ontology
Translation has long existed on the periphery of the study of literature, although its meaning has changed radically over the past four decades. Despite its significant importance as an intercultural activity, areas such as literary criticism and theory, various histories of national literatures, and even comparative literature, often consider translation to be something completely auxiliary to their interests. The main reason for this omission or indifference is the traditional perception of translation as a necessary evil. Translation can be seen as a strategy that tries to ease the constraints that humanity is facing, trying to establish contact with people belonging to other linguistic communities and their cultural heritage, transmitted through the written word. At the same time, it also serves as a way of reminding us of the imperfection of human nature and the vanity of attempts to overcome the curse of Babylon. This question may seem trivial, like the ontological status of design,
This perception implies an important paradox. He gives literary works, in particular, the great works that make up canonized literature, which are supposedly presented as models worthy of imitation, of dubious honor to be inimitable, not to mention the originality. This led to iterative and indiscriminate comparisons of the originals and their translations in order to compare the differences and thus reveal what was lost as a result of the inevitable, but also painful, interlanguage transformation. From this point of view, the custom of prematurely (and therefore unreasonable) consideration that any work surpasses its translation is not surprising.
Although the study of translation is one of the most effective tools for analyzing interreligious contacts, even the comparatists, until recently, could not or did not want to give the translation the recognition it deserves as the main driving force in the development of literature. The fact that translations have a derivative or a second character cannot be denied, since they logically require the presence of previously written text in another language, but there is no need to make the term “second” synonymous with “secondary”. The same question inevitably comes up when considering the ontological status of social reality.
Translations often use the stigma of secondary works because of their limited lifespan, since all cultural and linguistic changes that should be expected in any literary system throughout its existence cause damage to them. These changes determine the need to provide readers with versions of previous versions that ideologically and aesthetically correspond to new times. As a rule, the name of the original, as the name implies, is conferred on the concrete and exclusive expression of a particular author, although it is also a copy of the reality or reality that he / she imagines. Conversely, a translation is seen as a copy of a copy, simulacrum, imitation or interpretation of something tangible and true.
What is the status of the transfer
Nevertheless, although the translation is certainly a reproduction of the original, there is no need to single it out in favor of the latter, the only merit of which is often its predecessor in time. Indeed, as was sometimes noted, many forms of art include reproduction in their performance (for example, consider acts of interpretation on stage or in musical performances). In fact, translations provide an authentic interpretive function, since later versions of the same work open up new facets and are often updated after re-reading.
It is likely that the assumption that each original text must by its nature necessarily surpass its translation (both in ontological and qualitative terms) is strengthened in romanticism with the sublimation of creativity, individualism and originality. However, much earlier we can find numerous reports that do not speak of parity relations. , , , , , . , , , , , , , .
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Parmenides was one of the first in Greek tradition to propose an ontological characterization of the fundamental nature of existence. In his prologue or prome, he describes two views on existence; initially nothing comes from nothing, and therefore existence is eternal. Therefore, our opinions about the truth must often be false and deceitful. Much of Western philosophy — including the fundamental concepts of falsifiability — sprang from this perspective. This means that existence is that which can be conceived by a thought created or possessed. Therefore, there can be no emptiness, no vacuum; and true reality can neither appear nor disappear from existence. Rather, the fullness of creation is eternal, homogeneous and unchanging, although not infinite (he characterized its shape as the shape of a perfect sphere). Parmenides, therefore, argues that the change perceived in everyday life is illusory. Everything that can be perceived is only one part of a single entity. This idea to some extent anticipates the modern concept of the ultimate theory of the great unification, which ultimately describes all existence in terms of one interconnected subatomic reality that applies to everything.
Monism and Genesis
The opposite of eleatic monism is the pluralistic concept of Being. In the 5th century BC, Anaxagoras and Leucippus replaced the reality of Being (unique and unchanging) with the reality of the Becoming and, therefore, with a more fundamental and elementary ontic multiplicity. This thesis arose in the Hellenic world, set forth by Anaxagoras and Leucippus in two different ways. The first theory dealt with the "seeds" (which Aristotle called "homeomeries") of various substances. The second was atomistic theory, which dealt with reality based on vacuum, atoms and their internal motion in it. Modern monists often study the ontological status of virtual particles.
Atomism
The materialistic atomism proposed by Leucippus was vague, but then developed by Democritus in a deterministic way. Later (4th century BC) Epicurus again perceived the original atomism as non-deterministic. He confirmed reality as composed of an infinity of indivisible, unchanging corpuscles or atoms (atom, letters. “Uncut”), but he gives weight to characterize atoms, while for Leucippus they are characterized by “figure”, “order” and “position” in space. In addition, they create a whole with internal movement in a vacuum, creating a diverse stream of being. Their movement is affected by parenclisis (Lucretius calls it a clinamen), and this is determined by chance. These ideas foreshadowed our understanding of traditional physics until the nature of atoms was discovered in the 20th century. Given the features of mathematical knowledge, the ontological status of mathematical objects is still not fully understood.