The East Prussian operation of 1914 is called the offensive of the Russian army in Germany during the First World War. Despite success at an early stage, advance into the territory of the enemy could not be developed. Having won the first few battles, the Russian army was defeated in the battle at Tannenberg and was forced to retreat to their original positions on the rivers Neman and Narew. From a tactical point of view, the East Prussian operation of 1914 ended in failure. However, its strategic results were favorable for the Russian Empire and its allies.
Comparison of the forces of the parties
In August 1914, two armies were deployed at the starting positions under the command of Generals Alexander Samsonov and Pavel Rennenkampf . In total, Russian troops totaled 250 thousand people and 1200 artillery pieces. Both armies were subordinate to the front commander, General Yakov Grigorievich Zhilinsky . It is worth noting that during the East Prussian operation of 1914 there were clear contradictions between his orders and the orders of the headquarters.
The total number of opposing German troops was 173 thousand people. The German side had about a thousand artillery pieces. The German army was commanded by General Max von Pritz. A week after the start of the East Prussian operation, he was replaced by the famous military leader and politician Paul von Hindenburg.
Planning
The general task assigned to the armies of Samsonov and Rennenkampf was to defeat the German troops and develop the offensive deep into enemy territory. The Germans needed to be cut off from Koenigsberg and the Vistula. The venue of the East Prussian operation of 1914 at the initial stage was the area of the Masurian Lakes, bypassing which, the Russian troops had to strike the enemy on the flank. The General Staff assigned the implementation of this task to the army under the command of Samsonov. It was planned that she would cross the state border on August 19. Two days earlier, the army of Rennenkampf was to invade enemy territory and divert German troops, striking in the area of the cities of Insterburg and Angerburg .
Hasty action
International politics and relations with the Allies had a negative impact on the quality of planning and organization of the East Prussian operation of 1914. The government of the Russian Empire promised France to hurry with the start of the offensive. Hasty actions led to serious problems with obtaining detailed intelligence data on the deployment of the enemy and the establishment of communications between the Russian corps. The invasion of German territory was almost blind. Due to lack of time, the supply of troops was not properly organized. The reasons for the interruptions in supplies were not only in a hurry, but also in the absence in Poland of the required number of railways.
Command miscalculations
The likelihood of the failure of the East Prussian operation in August 1914 increased significantly due to the dramatic error made by the Russian General Staff . Having learned that only the German territorial troops (landver), which are distinguished by low combat effectiveness, defend the Berlin direction, the high command decided to create an additional strike group to develop an attack on the enemy capital. The reserves, which Samsonov and Rennenkampf's armies were supposed to strengthen, joined the new formation. As a result of this error, the strike potential of the participants in the East Prussian operation of 1914 was significantly reduced. The outcome of the battle was to some extent decided even before it began.
German army plans
The Kaiser General Staff assigned its troops in East Prussia only the task of retaining territory. The High Command did not give the army a concrete plan and to some extent provided freedom of decision-making depending on the development of the situation. The troops of General Pritvice were waiting for reinforcements, which were supposed to arrive 40 days after the start of the mobilization in Germany.
It should be noted that the German side, like the Russian side, was poorly prepared for the conduct of hostilities in terms of intelligence gathering. The German headquarters had very vague information about the size and deployment of enemy forces. The German command was forced to make decisions blindly.
Features of the landscape contributed to the conduct of defensive actions. On the territory of a powerful fortified area there were a large number of lakes, marshes and forested hills. Such a terrain prevented the advancement of the enemy. The narrow passages between the reservoirs made it possible to create effective defensive lines.
Start of operation
In accordance with the plan, the army of Rennenkampf crossed the state border on August 17 and immediately got into a battle with the enemy near the city of Stallupenen . This was the first battle of the East Prussian operation in 1914. Briefly, the result of this battle can be described as follows: Russian troops forced the Germans to retreat, but suffered serious losses. Given the fivefold superiority of the Rennenkampf soldiers, this episode can hardly be called a great success. The Russian army took Stallupenen , and the Germans retreated to the city of Gumbinnen . The next day, the offensive continued. The Russian cavalry tried to bypass Gumbinnen from the north, but collided with a brigade of German territorial forces and suffered losses. Samsonov’s army entered East Prussia on August 20. Having received information about this, the German headquarters decided to immediately enter the battle.
Battle of Gumbinnen
German divisions suddenly attacked the right flank of the Russian troops. This section of the front was opened due to the fact that the cavalry, after suffering losses, retreated and was inactive. The Germans managed to push back the Russian right-flank divisions. However, the further development of the attack was stifled due to dense artillery fire. The German army retreated, but the Russian troops were too tired to pursue them. Both sides suffered heavy losses. As a result of this battle, a threat to the environment loomed over the German corps.
Battle of Tannenberg
After Pritwitz informed the General Staff of his intention to continue the retreat inland, he was removed from his post and replaced by Paul Hindenburg . The new commander decided to concentrate his forces to defeat Samsonov’s army. The Russian headquarters mistakenly accepted the transfer of enemy divisions as a retreat. The command concluded that the bulk of the operation was completed. Based on these considerations, the two Russian armies began to pursue the enemy and move away from each other. Hindenburg took advantage of this situation to surround Samsonov’s divisions.
The flanks of the Russian troops, which advanced deep into enemy territory, were unprotected. Concentrated attacks by the German corps and landver brigades led to the flight to the rear of individual parts of Samsonov’s army. Communication with the headquarters was lost, and command and control was disorganized. During a random retreat, five divisions led by Samsonov were surrounded. The general shot himself, and his subordinates surrendered. Western European historians call the defeat of Samsonov’s army a battle at Tannenberg .
Eliminating one threat, the German command turned its attention to another. Superior enemy forces launched an offensive on the southern flank of Rennenkampf’s troops, intending to encircle them and destroy them. The attack was repelled with the help of the remains of Samsonov’s army, but the losses grew and the situation became hopeless. Russian troops returned to their original positions. The Germans could not encircle and destroy the army of Rennenkampf, but the offensive operation, the purpose of which was the capture of Prussia, ended in failure.
Summary
The attempt to invade the territory of Germany did not bring any results and turned into heavy losses. The results of the East Prussian operation of 1914, of course, were negative for the Russian army, but in the long run the tactical defeat turned into a strategic gain. For Germany, this theater of operations was secondary. The Kaiser government concentrated forces on the Western Front in order, first of all, to defeat France with one quick and powerful blow. The Russian invasion violated the strategic plans of Germany. To eliminate the new threat, the German General Staff needed to transfer more than a hundred thousand people from the Western Front. Russia diverted the forces intended to participate in the battle for France and saved the ally from defeat.
Briefly, the results of the East Prussian operation of 1914 can be formulated as follows: the invasion forced Germany to conduct military operations on two fronts, which predetermined the outcome of the world confrontation. The German side did not have enough resources for a protracted struggle. The intervention of the Russian Empire not only saved France, but also condemned Germany to defeat in the world war.