Gorbachev's foreign and domestic policy briefly: table

Only the incorrigible romantic idealists could dream of the victory of the world Marxist revolution in the second half of the eighties. With a naked eye one could see the inefficiency of the command-administrative economy and the absurdity of its results. The whole world, including countries at much lower levels of development, experienced the problem of selling surplus goods, while the so-called "socialist camp" suffered from their shortage. The USSR, the theoretically richest state, in practice could not feed its own population. At this critical moment, a man came to power who was not like the previous party leaders. Gorbachev’s foreign and domestic policy in a historically short period (in just six years) led to the destruction of almost everything that was created by three generations of Soviet people. Is the secretary general to blame or just the circumstances?

What kind of person is Gorbachev

For the Soviet leader, he was young. Citizens of the USSR, accustomed to slurred speeches of elderly leaders, initially listened with interest to the newly elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, marveling, in general, at the usual thing — the ability to speak Russian without a piece of paper. In 1985, M. S. Gorbachev was only 54 years old, by the party-nomenclature standards - “Komsomolets”. During the time before mastering the top leadership position, Mikhail Sergeyevich managed a lot: graduate from school (1950), work as a combine operator, enter the law faculty of Moscow State University, marry (1953), become a member of the CPSU and take the post of secretary of the city committee in Stavropol (1955). It is the last point of the biography that raises questions: many of the Soviet people did the previous, but sitting just two years after graduating in such a high chair is already a trick in the Houdini style. Well, okay, maybe a young man (22 years old) actually grabbed stars from the sky. Moreover, he was not the first secretary, but in order to pursue a career, he had to graduate from another university - agricultural - and work in the Komsomol.

Selection of a new Secretary General

Mikhail Sergeyevich has always "correctly understood" party foreign and domestic politics. Gorbachev was noticed, in 1978 he was "taken" to Moscow, where his serious party career began. He becomes the secretary of the Central Committee, so far neither the first nor the general one. Since 1982, the notorious "carriage races" began. Brezhnev was taken behind the Mausoleum (to the necropolis near the Kremlin wall) , then Andropov, followed by Chernenko, and the question arose of who to put on the responsible post to interrupt this mourning marathon. And they chose Gorbachev. He was the youngest challenger.

Early years

Of course, the appointment happened for a reason. They always fight for power, even standing with one foot in the grave. Prominent communist leaders noticed the young and seemingly promising party member, he was supported by Gromyko himself, and Ligachev and Ryzhkov saw in him the savior of the ideas of the founders.

At first, Mikhail Sergeyevich did not disappoint his proteges. He acted within the given framework, strengthened self-supporting relations, campaigned for accelerating, in general, the first two years, both Gorbachev’s foreign and domestic policies remained within the limits of permissible deviations from the party’s constantly fluctuating line. In 1987, there were some changes, at first glance insignificant, but in fact threatening tectonic shifts. The party allowed some types of private enterprise, limiting it to the cooperative movement so far. In fact, it was an undermining of the socialist foundations, pure water revisionism, a kind of NEP, but the results achieved in the 20s were not repeated in the 80s. Such an internal policy of Gorbachev did not lead to an improvement in the life of the bulk of the population and did not improve economic indicators, but caused a brainwave that led to the undermining of the ideological foundations of the existence of Soviet society.

Instead of filling the market with cheap consumer goods and improving service in the catering, there was a certain outrage. Cooperative cafes turned out to be accessible only to the same “cooperative workers” and their economic opponents - retailers (easier: ransomware). There were no more goods, they were able to adapt to new conditions with a relatively small layer of people of an adventurous character. But these were all just flowers ...

And in the fight with a green serpent snake wins

Gorbachev dealt the first truly serious blow to Soviet power by issuing an anti-alcohol decree. Stratification by the haves and not so, the poverty of the assortment, rising prices and much more, the population could forgive the talkative general secretary. But he encroached on a way of life familiar to the masses, on a natural way to escape from the gray Soviet reality. This domestic policy of Gorbachev turned away from him a significant part of the population. No doubt, it is necessary to fight against alcoholism, but the methods were completely unacceptable, and there were no more alternative ways of leisure. Of course, video salons appeared (again, cooperative ones), in which all sorts of Emmanuelles were played for a moderate fee, “Tender May” sounded from the windows of private “recording studios”, but all this could not compensate for the lack of strong drinks in the store. But moonshiners and rectified sellers managed.

The economic situation and its consequences

The West has long fought against communism, seeing in it a threat to its existence. Actually, in the 80s it was not a question of ideological confrontation - it was not necessary to hope that the theoretical research of the leaders of the USSR, published in huge print runs, could shake the foundations of a market economy. Western countries were afraid of the threats of less sophisticated ones - nuclear missiles, for example, or submarines. At the same time, their leaders acted not very logically: they undermined the economic foundations of the Soviet Union, playing to lower the price of oil and gas. This led to a budget deficit and, as a result, to an increased risk of accident rate of nuclear facilities. The Chernobyl catastrophe happened, in Afghanistan the war continued, bleeding the already poor budget. Gorbachev’s domestic and foreign policy was briefly characterized at that time as pro-Western. Dissidents were released and received with honor in the Kremlin. Destroyed short- and medium-range missiles, so disturbing western Europe (1987 treaty). All this was done involuntarily, but was presented as gestures of goodwill.

Separatism

The count on a friendly understanding of the West and its help was not justified. Gorbachev’s domestic policy looked even more miserable. It can be briefly described in one word: "helplessness." The separatist sentiment, fueled by foreign intelligence agencies, reached its climax. A series of interethnic conflicts (Tbilisi, Baku, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Baltic States) did not meet with a worthy rebuff - neither ideological, nor, in extreme cases, forceful. A society that has become weak in the fight against poverty has been demoralized. Gorbachev’s domestic policy could not rely on domestic resources, and she did not receive external material support. As luck would have it, an earthquake occurred in Armenia. The Soviet Union, which had recently seemed unshakable, crackled at the seams. Nationalist movements developed rapidly in Ukraine, in Moldova, in the Central Asian republics and within the RSFSR. The leadership of the country gutlessly looked at all this bacchanalia, throwing up their hands and verbally commenting on the ongoing bloodshed.

Restructuring

Gorbachev’s domestic policy was briefly defined by the very words “perestroika” and “democratization”. Any foreman knows that it is impossible to change the load-bearing structures of a building if people live in it, but the Secretary General considered otherwise. And the bricks flew over their heads ... The enterprises that worked for decades suddenly turned out to be unprofitable. The government even managed to mine gold at the mines at a loss. An ominous specter of unemployment loomed over the country. The calls "to do their work in good faith to everyone in their place" sounded too abstract. The discontent of the population grew and captured the wider public masses - from staunch supporters of socialism, indignant at unprecedented ideological concessions, to adherents of liberal values ​​complaining about the lack of freedom. By the end of the eighties, a systemic crisis had ripened, in which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev himself was largely guilty. The domestic policy pursued by him turned out to be ineffective and contradictory.

Foreign policy successes

In 1989, there was a unification of power in one person. The Secretary General also heads the Supreme Council, trying in some way to take control of the activities of the deputies, who are too "mischievous." This action was not crowned with success, the strong-willed qualities of the leader, who became the President of the USSR the next year (actually self-named), were clearly not enough.

The inconsistency and inconsistency of both Gorbachev’s domestic and foreign policies suffered. Briefly, it can be described as maintaining claims to superpower without means of actually confirming this status.

Soviet troops are leaving Afghanistan, but the backbone of the economy is already broken, and this does not save the situation. Nevertheless, Mikhail Sergeyevich makes many foreign friends - presidents, prime ministers and royal blood. They find the Soviet president a pleasant conversationalist, a nice person, at least they characterize him that way during the interview. This is Gorbachev’s domestic and foreign policy; it can be briefly defined as the desire to be pleasant in all respects.

Concessions to the West

The authority of the USSR in the world is rapidly declining, not only the United States, but also the small countries bordering the Union and most recently their great neighbor, at least with caution, are no longer taking into account the opinion of the Soviet leader.

The notorious expansion of NATO to the East began in the late Gorbachev years. The weakening of the Union’s position in the international arena has turned away from it the former satellites around the world, and primarily Eastern European. The lack of resources forced the Soviet leadership to first cut back, and then completely stop helping regimes pursuing anti-imperialist (or anti-American) policies. Even a new term has appeared: “new thinking,” with emphasis on the first syllable, as if it were a mouse. At least that's what Gorbachev himself said. Domestic and foreign policy (a table of events preceding the collapse of the world socialist system is presented below) is bursting at all seams ...

That was (as Gorbachev understood it) domestic and foreign policy. The table of achievements in the field of state reform looks no less depressing:

There are few examples in the history of the USSR that led to such devastating consequences as Gorbachev’s domestic policy. The table clearly demonstrates that in all three main areas of reform, the result was unsuccessful.

The final

The coup attempt, called the putsch, undertaken in August 1991, demonstrated the complete impotence of the supreme power in front of the formidable realities of the end of the millennium. The domestic policy of M. S. Gorbachev, weak and inconsistent, soon led to the collapse of the Soviet Union into fifteen fragments, most of which suffered from “phantom pains” of the post-communist period. The consequences of concessions in the international arena are felt today.