At the end of the 19th century, military theory underwent serious measurements and at the same time received a powerful impetus for development. The emergence of new arms and communications, the construction of powerful armored ships armed with large-caliber artillery, airships and airplanes made the generals of many countries think about what the future war would be like. It was then, in 1891, in the Austro-Hungarian General Staff that the famous Schlieffen plan began to be worked out. This product of German militarism then, two decades after the shameful defeat, will again loom like a ghost, already in the form of new aggressive strategic theories and dispositions. The lesson didnât go for the future.
History cannot be forgotten; it itself will remind nasty students of itself. The article will outline Schlieffenâs plan briefly, since in a detailed form it would take up too much space, and the details in this case are not so important. Its essence and the political circumstances that prompted the count, chief of the general staff, to recall Napoleon are of significance.
The Nibelungen Myth
There is a myth about a certain âGerman military machineâ that acted clearly and mercilessly, perfectly organized and based on traditional Teutonic discipline. Of course, cultural figures, in particular cinematographers, made a lot of films, in which huge columns of âiron capsâ irresistibly creeping forward to scary music, and soldiers in horned helmets mint a step, whipping road dust, to create this image. If, however, an open mind to consider the facts, it turns out that until the nineteenth century, the German army somehow did not have time to cover themselves with laurels of military glory, if only because, as a single state, Germany exists, by historical standards, very briefly, and the exploits of the rulers of individual lands also happened infrequently. At the end of the 19th century, there were some successes (more about them later), but one can speak of some exceptional Aryan militancy only under the impression received from Wagner's operas about the Nibelungs and Valkyries.
As for the twentieth century, yes, the Germans excelled. They started two world wars, and both suffered a crushing defeat. There are several explanations for this. Proponents of a technocratic and formalistic outlook on history argue that the failure of material and human resources is the fault of German failure. Fans of the occult point to the unfavorable location of stars in the sky. There were also theories of a worldwide conspiracy against smart, strong, but gullible Germans. Realists, on the other hand, see the reason for the collapse of the âGerman military machineâ in both world wars as the aggressor is defeated sooner or later.
Nevertheless, it is very interesting to consider attempts to create ingenious plans to conquer neighboring countries. They are somewhat similar to the designs of perpetual motion machines or the search for the philosopher's stone. Now itâs clear that these tasks have no solution, but curiosity and even to some extent respect the resourcefulness of the human mind during the thought process itself. So what do we know about Schlieffenâs plan?
Reasons for hope and optimism
Out of sheer curiosity, strategy theorists do not work. It was no accident that Schlieffen's plan was developed. This work of military theoretical science was in demand by the leadership of two empires.
The aggressive mood of the German military at the end of the 19th century was due to two circumstances. Firstly, Austria-Hungary did not have colonies, which greatly upset the ruling elite of the empire. Overseas possessions were in France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Denmark and even small, seemingly harmless Belgium, not to mention the "mistress of the seas" of Great Britain (at that time it was the largest country in the world, much larger than the Russian Empire ) A sense of deprivation, also sometimes called envy, tormented William II of Hohenzollern. But that was not all; there was a second circumstance. On the account of the German army there were two relatively recent victories, which could conditionally be called brilliant. In 1866, the Prussians led by von Moltke Sr. (the great Moltke) defeated the troops of Austria-Hungary. Victoria was defeated and over France (1870-1871). Then even Emperor Napoleon III himself was captured (near Sedan), and with it 549 cannons and 104 thousand soldiers. This inspired cautious optimism and hope for future victories. If it happened once, then what could prevent it from developing success further? Is that the lack of a good military plan. Of course, the army itself needs to be modernized, and military equipment, but the main thing is theory. The first column is marching here, the second is going there, etc.
Difficulties
However, some circumstances did not inspire optimism. It was with their account that Schlieffen's plan was drawn up. This is, first of all, the need for fighting on two fronts. Both von Bismarck and Field Marshal Moltke believed that in this case a collapse was inevitable. The fact is that already in the described period of time, success in the war depended to a large extent on the resource base. This concept refers to the mobilization potential, including human, industrial and raw materials. But in this regard, neither Austria-Hungary nor the German Empire could boast a special abundance. Actually, it was for the sake of seizing resources that the Schlieffen plan was drawn up. This meant that you need to fight quickly and victoriously.
The main probable opponents were named two countries: the Russian Empire and France. One in the West, the other in the East. At the same time, the border on the French side is well fortified along its entire length.
Teutonic trick
Schlieffenâs plan called for waging war on two fronts, contrary to Bismarckâs insistent recommendation. There was one caveat: this situation should be short-lived. More specifically, as a result of the energetic actions of the Triple Alliance, one of the main opponents should be defeated in a short time, and then it was necessary to switch by all means to the second, with which you can no longer be in a hurry, although you should not hesitate. Schliffen called France the first goal of the crush. As already mentioned, its border was strengthened quite powerfully, and a frontal attack could fail. However, not having achieved good luck in the West, Austria-Hungary and Germany were guaranteed to fall into the trap of a protracted conflict, which cannot be allowed, because this is the path to defeat. There seemed to be no solution. The main thing that Schlieffen's plan consisted of was solving a complex problem in the simplest way. Hitler used it in 1939.
Speed, Onslaught, and Treachery
Belgium was a neutral country, its security was guaranteed by Britain, Russia, France, Austria-Hungary and, by the way, Prussia itself (now Germany). The same is true for Luxembourg. The passage of troops through both of these neutral countries provided for Schlieffen's plan. This treacherous violation of the international treaty of 1839 did not at all concern the author of the idea. He understood that immediately after the capture of Belgium, Britain would inevitably enter the war, but the main bet was on lightning speed. The blow must be quick and to the very heart - in this case, Paris. After this, the landing of the English landing becomes problematic, the French army is squeezed by a roundabout maneuver and encircled, while the Russians will turn around and pull up ... A little more, and all the power of the Austro-Hungarian empire will hit them, and they will not resist. This was the essence of Schlieffenâs plan: quickly, in 40-50 days, he would deal with France, push Britain off the coast and turn towards Russia. You donât need to capture all of it - itâs too long and expensive, and indeed to nothing (it was thought then), but some western regions, in particular Poland and the Baltic States, can be taken away.
Who was to fight with
Schlieffenâs plan called for an aggressive war against three countries that surpassed the Triple Alliance in resources and military power . Britain owned the world's most powerful navy, which Germany could not create. The Russian Empire had a large army, the rearmament of which had already begun, with an excellent food base (food cards were not introduced even when they supplied the population of all the other warring states) and a defense industry capable of producing almost any kind of weapon. France was also preparing for war. Schlieffen's plan called for the quick crush of the weakest link in the land theater of operations. The naval confrontation with Great Britain was considered as a separate episode of the war, which was not of vital importance, and the Russian troops, according to him, should only be kept on the Galicia-southern Poland line.
Source of inspiration
General Alfred von Schlieffen, who led the German General Staff, was not only a strategist, but also a military historian. From his youth, he considered the Battle of Cannes (216 BC) to be his favorite episode, during which Hannibal defeated the Roman troops, enveloping them with a bold maneuver from the flanks into a double ring. In essence, Schlieffenâs plan briefly repeats this tactical device, creating an asymmetric movement of armies with cutting off most of the French troops from sources of supply, their blockade and strangulation.
In addition, some operations carried out by Bonaparte at the beginning of the 19th century were taken as examples. These techniques are quite appropriate during operations at the European theater of operations, characterized by relatively short distances and a dense network of railways in the conditions of ownership of a strategic initiative. Ultimately, Schlieffenâs plan was adopted by the command of the combined forces of Austria-Hungary, Italy and Germany, albeit with some changes. The fact is that its author fell into disgrace. He was removed from his post, and Colonel General Moltke, Jr. was appointed to lead the Great General Staff . Perhaps his famous surname played a role.
Contribution of General Moltke the Younger
It is not known how successful the strategic operation would have been if Shliffenâs plan had remained unchanged. According to the original plan, the main forces in the amount of seven armies rushed to Paris, while only one was put up against Russia. At the same time, the command was aware of the possibility of losing the (temporary) Alsace, Lorraine and East Prussia. This "gambit" allowed to gain the time necessary for the complete defeat of France. However, Moltke Jr. considered the sevenfold advantage on the Western Front excessive and reduced the number of armies on it to three. In addition, he strengthened the eastern direction (again, due to troops aimed at Paris). Schlieffen's plan was adopted with such changes that almost nothing remained of the original plan. The calculation that with the help of railway transport it would be possible to quickly transfer huge masses of troops to the Russian front also turned out to be incorrect. Ultimately, what Schlieffen was so afraid of happened. Blitzkrieg failed, the Austrians got bogged down in a positional war. It could end only in defeat.
It was smooth on paper ...
In fairness, it should be remembered that no one military plan in the history of mankind has ever been fully implemented. There were always reasons, excuses too, and for the most part they were objective. Then frosts suddenly hit, then, on the contrary, mud and mud. The calculation that the Russian army would be a weak adversary, clumsy and stupid turned out to be wrong. Despite the fact that the eighty-thousand-strong group strengthened the defensive position of the Austrians, they could not stop the offensive, it developed rapidly and raised fears that Berlin would fall before France could be defeated. The 1st Russian army near the German city of Gumbinnen completely defeated the German VIII army. The failure of Schlieffen's plan was becoming increasingly apparent.
The suffering of Alfred von Schlieffen
The author described in detail the disposition of each military unit, its movement and the chronology of actions. Schlieffenâs plan in the First World War is perhaps the most striking example of a thorough study of all possible details, which was not equal at that time. Work on it went on for several years, and the Count devoted himself to working with the fanaticism of a true ascetic or maniac. Sometimes he behaved like a madman, in any beautiful landscape seeing only the situation for tactical maneuver and perceiving rivers or lakes only as water barriers that were to be forced. Schlieffen did not live to see the war, but he thought about it constantly. According to the stories of people close to him, he, dying in 1912, begged not to weaken the troops on the right flank. Apparently, Moltke, who came to replace him, did not fully understand what Schlieffen's plan consisted of, as well as how fatal any changes made to him could be. However, there is no evidence that the document was drawn up flawlessly. It may have had errors, moreover, system ones.
About the dangers of illusions
Schliffen was a military man and understood little in politics. As a true technocrat, he enthusiastically worked out solutions to various problems, with little concern for the consequences of the âside effectsâ. Belgium, captured by strategic necessity, became a symbol of the aggressiveness of the Triple Alliance and actually served as an occasion for the blockade of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Britainâs entry into the war also greatly undermined the economic foundations of commodity-dependent states, and the Royal Navy did everything to impede the supply of maritime communications. The psychological impact that the Schlieffen plan had on the minds of German politicians is great.
In the first European slaughter, it was not possible to realize it, but there was a man who decided to try again. The attempt began in 1939 and ended six years later with another complete defeat of Germany. At the same time, the stake was again placed on quick coverage (this time by large armored formations) and lightning-fast suppression of enemy resistance. It seemed quite a bit more, and the enemy would be defeated. The war on two fronts again led to disaster. Belief in the omnipotence of the Blitzkrieg played a nasty joke, especially in the event of an attack on Russia. Did this lesson go for the future?