The military reform of Alexander 2 became a necessity after the end of the Crimean War. The battle fully illuminated all the flaws of the Russian army, showed its inability to withstand the power of bourgeois countries. The military system required fundamental changes. The change of minister (instead of Dolgorukov was appointed Sukhozanet) did not really change the situation. Some cost reductions and the elimination of military settlements could not lead to transformations.
Assessing what was happening, the king understood that the department needed completely new people and a new approach to army management .
The military reform of Alexander 2 began with the appointment of Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin as Minister. This figure, possessing excellent theoretical training, the necessary experience and skills, as well as excellent personal qualities, suited, like no other, the role of a reorganizer of the Russian army.
First of all, the service life was reduced to 16 years (from 25). It was further forbidden to send soldiers for crimes, to apply corporal punishment, which were common in the army. The military reform of Alexander 2 involved the introduction of literacy.
Milyutin created a new management system. The formation of military districts made it possible to eliminate excessive centralization and contributed to the rapid (if necessary) deployment of the army. Along with this, the military reform of Alexander 2 also affected the War Ministry itself. The reorganization of the structure involved the transfer of great authority to the minister. In addition, military schools were reformed. This made it possible to introduce qualitative changes in the officers. In addition, the ongoing judicial reform of Alexander 2 contributed to the changes.
However, the reorganization measures adopted were not enough. It was necessary to radically change the whole military business, which implies the introduction of a new system of formation of troops. Thus, everything went towards the introduction of universal conscription instead of the old recruit. A new system was supposed to accept soldiers for short-term service, after which they were enlisted. This method of forming troops allowed the majority of the population to be drawn through the army. If necessary, people who served could always be quickly mobilized. This approach to the formation of troops allowed to significantly reduce costs. In addition, the service itself was facilitated.
Milyutin for the first time tried to express the idea of changing the way the army was equipped in 1862. However, his words did not find a response. Meanwhile, the development of military-technical power and the strengthening of military sentiments among large states continued in Europe. Under these conditions, the reorganization of the army's picking system was necessary. However, its implementation was hindered not only by the resistance of the generals and aristocracy. An effective innovation could be in the presence of a developed system of transport and means of communication, in conditions of rapid mobilization of the reserve. By the beginning of the 60s of the 19th century, this system was absent in Russia.
By the beginning of the 70s, the development of the railway network contributed to the military transformation.
A new draft charter was adopted in 1874, January 1. From that moment on, universal military service extended to the entire male population of the state, which had reached the age of twenty. Thus, in peacetime in Russia there was a relatively small army, and in case of war the state had the opportunity to call up a reserve and a militia, creating massive troops.
In addition, the transformation also affected the armament of the soldiers. With the new system of formation of troops, a modern system of guns began to be used, and a rifle entered service. At the same time, the construction of the fleet developed.
The great reforms of Alexander 2 in the military sphere contributed to increasing the combat effectiveness of the country's army.