Fans of military history are familiar with the Soviet T-70 tank designed by Nikolai Alexandrovich Astrov.
The characteristics of this combat vehicle immediately speak for themselves: this combat field combat vehicle belongs to the light type.
A depressing fact prompted the creation of a new military tank: combat tests of the Red and Light tanks of the Red Army (models from T-38 to T-60) during the first year of the Second World War revealed their lack of competitiveness.
In January 1942, the 70th tank was demonstrated to Stalin as an enhanced version of the previous representative of the T-60 light tank line, and its serial production began in March.
Brief TTX of the T-70 light tank
Consider the main characteristics of the brainchild of Astrov:
- thickness of frontal armor: bottom - 45 mm; top - 35 mm;
- thickness of the side armor - 15 mm;
- main armament: 20-K cannon with a caliber of 45 mm (previously used in the T-50 tank);
- ammunition - 90 shells;
- 7.62 mm machine gun, 15 disks with 945 rounds;
- two four-stroke six-cylinder gasoline engines with a capacity of 70 liters. from.;
- speed on rough terrain - up to 25 km / h, on the highway - 42 km / h;
- cruising range - 360 km, along the highway - 450 km;
- on the command vehicle - walkie-talkie 12T or 9P.
The design of the T-70 was initially critical
T-70 - a tank of the Great Patriotic War, reviews of which are quite contradictory. And this is despite the fact that the number of such manufactured tanks (almost 8.5 thousand units) was second only to the famous T-34! An objective look at its advantages and disadvantages reveals the main reason for this historical and technical incident. It is commonplace: often a project that is initiated and promoted not by end users (in this case, the military), but by the highest party leadership, is a failure.
The initial pre-war thesis for the development of armored forces is “The army needs a good light tank!” - turned out to be erroneous. Strategists did not take into account the prospect of arming the Wehrmacht (and this happened in 1942) with 50 and 75 mm artillery. Enhanced enemy guns effectively from any angle hit the T-70. The tank was inferior to the German "tigers" and "panthers" with guns of the 75th caliber both in terms of firepower and armor protection. The commander of the fifth tank army, M. Katukov, unflatteringly wrote about them to G.K. Zhukov, pointing out the impossibility of using the T-70 in an oncoming tank battle due to pre-guaranteed losses.
Mistakenly chosen design direction?
Indeed, Russian WWII tanks were initially created by the commonplace by perfecting the previous model, without forecasting based on intelligence from the weapons of the battlefield created by the enemies. Based on the foregoing, unflattering reviews about the imperfection of the T-70 seem logical. Just improving the T-60 tank was not enough. Now, more than 70 years after the implementation of the project of this weapon, we can already justify the impasse of such motivation.
Light tanks (a photo of them is proof of that) would be ideal on the fronts of the First World War. It was for the guns of that time that the armor of the designer Astrov’s tank was practically impenetrable. The second important trump card was the speed and maneuverability of the T-70.
In other words, the need to produce light tanks for the army in the middle of the 20th century was a fantasy of Soviet strategists of that time, who had not grown tactically or strategically since the civil war. Weapons customers should think in an adequate way to modern military thought!
Identified design flaws of the T-70 - an indicator of its insolvency?
Similar shortcomings were characteristic of almost all light tanks of that time, therefore, looking ahead, we state a fact: none of them became really effective on the battlefield.
All light Russian WWII tanks were designed to order by lead designer Astrov Nikolai Alexandrovich, like the T-70. Tests of new weapons, conducted in 1941, revealed directions for improving the tank:
- increased armor;
- replacement of a single cast tower with a double hexagon;
- Strengthening the transmission, tracks, suspension torsion bars, road wheels;
- replacement of the main gun with a more modern one (the latter was never implemented).
What can I say? Are there too many flaws inherent in the base model? Is it really such a basic model that was in demand by the Red Army?
The further evolution of tank building proved the inappropriateness of light tanks on the battlefield: armies of different countries gradually abandoned such battlefield weapons in principle. Instead, other light armored vehicles, mainly fulfilling the role of support, which no longer act as the main fire armored force of the battlefield, were developed. However, on the other hand, the process of creating and modifying the T-70 turned out to be very creative.
Series Types
Industrial production of T-70 light tanks was carried out in a variant that corresponded to the original design of the designer Astrov, as well as in a modified version of the T-70M.
The first variety had unreinforced armor, less weight - 9.2 tons and more ammunition - 90 shells; the second - more weight (9.8 tons), achieved through additional booking, strengthening of nodes and parts. The ammunition of the upgraded tank was reduced to 70 shells.
In fact, these were structurally different combat vehicles having different, non-interchangeable parts.
Kursk Bulge - a fiasco for the T-70 light tank
Actually, the army needed medium and heavy tanks, capable of effectively defeating enemy armored vehicles.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevsky, dishonestly repressed and shot in the basement of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Soviet Court, did not hear the party bonuses: “The future war will be a war of tank formations!”
And, accordingly, the defense industry of the USSR since 1942 mass-produced T-70 - a tank whose combat potential in 1943 could not stand the rigorous test - an uncompromising oncoming tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka (the battle of Kursk).
The armor did not save: even its frontal part easily penetrated the 75th and 50th caliber of enemy artillery. Moreover, the tank turned out to be vulnerable even to the outdated German regimental artillery of 37 mm caliber. The examination by the oncoming tank battle was failed and, accordingly, after the Kursk Bulge, the mass production of the T-70 was stopped.
However, strangely enough, it was at the second stage of the Great Patriotic War, when the Red Army was uncontrollably advancing, a number of skilled military commanders expressed regret at the premature farewell to the T-70. Despite the obvious flaws, the tank turned out to be useful!
On the positive combat qualities of the T-70
It was not possible to reveal its positiveness to new tankers. At the same time, tank battle asses in rugged and wooded areas even preferred this light vehicle to the more armored medium T-34. How did they motivate such a choice? Firstly, German heavy guns and heavy tanks hit the T-34 and T-70 almost equally. In addition, in view of the smaller size of a light tank, aimed fire at it is possible from a distance of half a kilometer, while along the T-34 from a kilometer distance.
Also, with the help of T-70 it was possible to use the surprise factor when attacking the enemy. At the same time, both the heavy IS tank and the medium T-34 were deprived of this possibility due to more noisy diesel engines.
Almost closely, unnoticed, a light tank T-70 drove up over rough terrain to the enemy camp. After all, the noise of the operation of a paired gasoline engine of 140 l. from. in terms of sound, it resembled only a passenger car. Lieutenant General Bogdanov reported to the Main Armored Directorate that, due to its low noise level, the T-70 ideally performed the function of chasing a retreating enemy.
The location of the fuel tanks in the rear of the hull contributed to an extremely rare detonation of fuel when it enters the tank.
In 1944, when about one and a half thousand T-70 tanks remained in the tank units of the Red Army, the OGK of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry stated its effectiveness in urban battles. "Seventy" was difficult to defeat "Faustpatrons" and grenades due to its small size and high maneuverability.
Manufacturability
It should be recognized that the Soviet T-70 tank in its design turned out to be one of the most technologically effective. For its manufacture, a thoroughly balanced production base of the GAZ plant was used. Collaboration was effectively established with suppliers of components and assemblies.
Effectively organized repair of weapons based on the T-70, damaged on the fronts.
Initially, the designer Astrov launched its production at the Gorky Automobile Plant.
In 1942, the factory workers produced 3495 units of this weapon, and in 1943 - 3348. Then the production of the T-70 in 1942 was also debugged at the factory number 38 (Kirov). 1,378 of these tanks were made here.
It was also planned to attract the Sverdlovsk Plant No. 37 to the production of the tank. However, it was not prepared here, and the technological costs turned out to be critically high. It required twice as many engines as for the T-60, making more powerful rolled armor was more time-consuming. The result is a modest result: 10 tanks and the cessation of production.
An objective look at the design flaws of the tank
The fact is obvious: the idea of ​​an effective light tank on the fronts of World War II turned out to be a complete utopia. Therefore, the work on the project of creating the T-70 (despite the mass of original engineering findings, which we will write about later) obviously resembled Sisyphean labor, that is, it was doomed to failure.
To begin with, the Soviet WWII tanks (and the subject of our description as well) had a layout design that was not without obvious drawbacks, involving 5 sections:
- management;
- motor (on the right - in the middle of the body);
- combat (tower and left - in the middle of the hull);
- feed (where the gas tanks and radiator were located).
A tank with similar compartments was front-wheel drive, so its undercarriage was characterized by increased vulnerability.
T-70 - an exhibit of the armored museum in Kubinka (Moscow region)
It's no secret that light tanks (photos of the Japanese “Ha-Go” and the German PzKpfw-II, modern with the T-70, are presented below) should be designed taking into account technical and combat criteria that are mutually exclusive:
- effective distribution of duties between crew members (functional overload of the tank commander in a crew of two people, which also included the driver);
- the firepower of the gun was insufficient (the design of the light tank assumed as the main weapon a 45-mm rifled automatic cannon 20-K of the 1932 model).
Those wishing to see the typical T-70 armament - the main gun and the DT-29 machine gun coaxial with it, with a caliber of 7.62 mm - we recommend visiting the specialized military armored museum (Kubinka). Museum guests can see both the equipment and the equipment of the crew members.
The tank commander was in the tower compartment, which is offset to the left relative to the longitudinal axis, and also captures the left middle part of the hull. According to his duties, he directed the actions of the driver through internal communication, monitored the situation, loaded and shot from a weapon and a machine gun coupled with it.
The driver was in the front of the copus, in the middle.
Since the exhibits of the museum are carefully restored and, as they say, are on the go, sightseers can consider the existing components and assemblies of the T-70, making up a visual impression for themselves. What do we mean when we mention the functional overload of the tank commander? Too many mechanical, routine processes in it were not automated. Visitors to the museum (Kubinka) may notice this drawback. One has only to carefully examine the mechanisms of the restored combat vehicle. Judge for yourself:
- manual drive device turret;
- manual drive lift for guns;
- when firing fragmentation-type shells, the semi-automatic did not work, and the commander was forced to manually open the shutter and pull out the hot fired cartridge case.
Due to these factors, which objectively interfere with the battle, the design rate of fire - up to 12 rounds per minute - was unattainable. Actually, the T-70 per minute fired up to 5 shots.
By the way, in the same museum, namely in pavilion No. 6, visitors can see the tanks of fascist Germany: “tigers” and “panthers”, which were in conflict with the Soviet tank we are considering.
The rapidly evolving, but still far from perfect Soviet tanks of the Second World War invariably enjoy the attention of visitors.
The popular chassis of the T-70
Especially for the T-70, the GAZ-203 twin engine was developed. Ahead - the GAZ-70-6004 engine, and behind - the GAZ-70-6005. Six-cylinder four-stroke engines - both were deformed to increase reliability and resource.
The T-70 transmission inherited from the previous model was generally positive. It consisted of:
- double-disc clutch;
- 4-speed gearbox;
- cardan shaft stepped type;
- conical final drive;
- Onboard multi-plate clutches;
- single row final drives.
The T-70 caterpillar consisted of 91 trucks 26 cm wide.
Instead of a conclusion: military equipment based on the T-70
However, the T-70 was not a dead end model. Self-propelled artillery mount SU-76 was developed by the Design Bureau of Plant No. 38 (Kirov) on the basis of its elongated undercarriage. The main weapon of this self-propelled guns was the 76-mm gun ZIS-3. The very body of the T-70 tank turned out to be technological and promising.
Designing new weapons was dramatic. The first designer, Semyon Aleksandrovich Ginzburg, was accused of non-existent “sins” after the deplorable consequences of the Kuskoy Arc, was deprived of the right to construct, sent to the front where he died. The commissar of tank construction, Salzman I.M., who had a conflict with him, had a hand in this. However, this ambitious official was soon reasonably dismissed.
Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Malyshev, appointed to his post, has appointed a competition for the modification of SU-76, where representatives of GAZ and plant No. 38 were involved.
As a result, self-propelled guns were re-arranged and launched into mass production. The 75-mm gun made it possible to successfully destroy enemy self-propelled guns, light and medium tanks. It was also relatively effective in fighting the heavy Panther, piercing the cannon mask and side armor. In the fight against the newer and more armored “tiger”, the SU-76 was ineffective before the introduction of a cumulative and sub-caliber projectile.
In the second half of 1944, the ZKS-37 anti-aircraft self-propelled gun, which was created on the basis of the chassis of the T-70 tank, entered service with the Red Army.
Today, amateur collectors have the opportunity to purchase any model of the T-70 tank. The price of the base model (life size) is 5 million rubles. We make a reservation that it is equipped with an original chassis, but, of course, is not intended for battle. At the same time, the latest improvements are offered: from a leather interior to an echo sounder.