Underestimating an adversary is always a big mistake even on a football field, not to mention a big war. Trying to prevail over the Soviet Union as soon as possible, realizing the so-called blitzkrieg, the supreme command of Nazi Germany miscalculated. The first successes turned the Wehrmacht's head: the German troops near Moscow were almost at the end of the summer, and Hitler must have thought that it was a hat. But the capital was too tough for him. This was one of those turning points that radically changed the course of the war and turned the victorious German march into shameful flight, which ended in the suicide of the Fuhrer.
When the Earth was rotated back
The Red Army, already exhausted by fighting and continuous retreat, should have felt, according to the Germans, a breakdown. However, the Nazis themselves were exhausted. No matter what losses the Soviet troops suffered, they could not be denied courage. After the shock of the first days of the war, for every inch of their native land, the Red Army fought fiercely.
The heroic defense of cities (for example, the legendary Mogilev) is the best evidence of this. The ease with which the Germans advanced east was largely apparent. The losses were great, but the Wehrmacht believed that the defenders of Moscow were in an even more demoralized state. Despite the fact that by the beginning of winter it became obvious that the front was stretched, the forces were dispersed, the Germans still intended to launch an offensive near Moscow: the capture of the capital was not only military, but also psychological.
The Soviet government understood the risks, and it is obvious that the idea of ​​following the example of Kutuzov — burning the city and handing it over to the enemy — wandered in some minds, and quite persistently. Back in early October, a plan for the destruction of the Moscow Metro appeared: it was supposed to mine the stations, dismantle the equipment, and transport the wagons to the rear. On October 15, the General Staff of the Defense adopted a resolution on the evacuation of the capital, and on the 16th for the first (and only) time in history the Moscow metro did not open. Ominous rumors spread throughout the city, part of the population succumbed to panic.
The order to destroy the metro was canceled only in the evening of October 16: Stalin decided to stay. Meanwhile, things at the front were still not going well. It was reported about the breakthroughs of the Nazis who met in December 1941 near Moscow, and it seemed that the Wehrmacht was about to make the last effort and guarantee itself a victory. In fact, it turned out differently. Not wishing to give up the USSR clung to every bump. The front stretched for a thousand kilometers, and despite the fact that the main forces of the Germans were concentrated precisely in the east (to be honest, Europe did not resist too much), by the end of autumn it became clear that the USSR could not be conquered in a snap.
Offensive preparations
Meanwhile , the Soviet command wasted no time and was preparing a large-scale counterattack by the Red Army near Moscow. Back in the middle of autumn, by no means favorable conditions, when intense battles were fought, the Supreme High Command Headquarters found a way to form a reserve of a dozen armies and strengthen the already fighting ones. At the same time, attention was focused on the fact that the new forces were not intended to defend themselves, but quite the opposite. They were spent very economically, and the commanders received an unequivocal order to prepare their subordinates for battle in an offensive setting.
By the end of autumn, it became obvious that the Wehrmacht had run out of steam: the rapid advance choked, and on some sections of the front, Soviet troops managed to inflict serious damage on the Nazis, forcing them to forget about the imminent celebration of the capture of Moscow. Soviet formations began to be pulled into places from which it was supposed to act. The right and left flanks of the Western Front, which was assigned the leading role in the upcoming operation, were strengthened: for example, more than two-thirds of all aircraft involved near Moscow were sent to help Zhukov.
Successful start of operation
It was very important to determine the time when to begin the counterattack of the Red Army near Moscow, and I must say that a remarkable military talent was shown by the Soviet command in this matter. As they say, that commander who knows how to make decisions not only quickly, but also correctly, is brilliant. At the beginning of winter, circumstances were as successful as possible. The necessary line of protective structures did not exist yet, and the corresponding team was not received (it will be received, but only on December 8, when the counteroffensive of troops near Moscow lasted for the third day and valuable time was hopelessly lost).
According to the plan of the operation, the Western Front had to deliver a series of attacks in order to push the enemy back on the right and left flanks (directions of Solnechnogorsk, Istra, Klin, Bogoroditsk and Uzlovaya).
Unions of the South-Western Front were supposed to advance on Yelets, and if successful, develop it in the Oryol direction. The third front that participated in the operation - Kalininsky - received the combat mission to move in the direction of Mikulin of the ancient settlement and Turginovo with the prospect of being behind enemy lines.
The air forces also had a difficult task: on the one hand, to support the Soviet counter-offensive near Moscow, and on the other, to defend the capital from the bombing that had become familiar to citizens from the first day of the war. An important intelligence activity was also assigned to aviation. In general, the Air Force played a huge role in the operation, largely determining the outcome of the battle.
Balance of power
Despite the fact that the closest attention was paid to the strengthening of all three fronts involved in the operation, the superiority of the Nazis was still obvious. Soviet troops were inferior both in numbers and (especially) weapons.
At the disposal of the commanders of the offensive was six hundred thousand people less than personnel (1.7 from the Nazis, 1.1 from the Red Army), only 7.6 thousand guns and mortars against 13.5 thousand from the Germans, 774 tanks against 1.17 thousand enemy. The superiority was only in aviation: German aircraft - 615, Soviet - 1000. But even in this barrel of honey there was a fly in the ointment, because more than half (about 53%) of the Red Army aircraft were representatives of old, not very effective modifications.
The flank of the German "Center" was subjected to the main blow. During protracted battles, it was they who were at the most disadvantaged position: from almost all sides surrounded by Soviet troops.
Unexpected blow
The trump card was surprise: the beginning of the counteroffensive was a complete surprise for the enemy. It must be said that preparations for the strike were carried out in the strictest confidence, and the Germans did not find the money or the luck to scout out plans for the Soviet headquarters.
Large military experts, both domestic and foreign, admit that the defeat of German troops near Moscow was made possible in many respects thanks to the exceptionally successful start of the operation. The exhausted army of the enemy grew weak, did not have time to strengthen. The configuration of the front line, in which the enemy’s flanks were practically surrounded, gave the Red Army the widest opportunities - and it took advantage of them.
The first on December 5, in the morning dawn, struck a blow to the Kalinin Front’s units, the very next day supported by the troops of the Western and South-Western. At first, they moved slowly: the experienced Germans managed to impose small battles for the opponents for each fortified point. Snowfall also made it difficult to move: it was worth to move away from the beaten track, and maneuvering became very problematic. The matter was complicated by the fact that the battle of Moscow 1941-1942. was the first major offensive operation of the Red Army: before that, Soviet fighters had the opportunity to acquire completely opposite experience, which could not serve as an aid.
Nevertheless, it was possible to discard the enemy hordes - albeit with a creak and the price of great sacrifices. On the very first day of fighting, some formations managed to cross the Volga and create a threat to the enemy rear.
Build success
The counterattack of the Red Army near Moscow began to rapidly increase its pace on the second day after its start. The 1st and 30th armies rather briskly moved towards Klin, the 20th army pursued the enemy in the Solnechnogorsk direction, and the 16th army - in Istra. Even more successfully moved towards Tula. The 10th Army, with the support of cavalry and tanks, unexpectedly quickly attacked Stalinogorsk.
Such a rapid development of events brought some confusion in the hitherto harmonious ranks of the enemy, who seemed invincible. Hitler, who did not expect any clear resistance from the USSR, was not ready to react quickly and correctly. The result was the defeat of German troops near Moscow. Only on December 8, the Führer, as they say, realized that the enemy’s military successes were not episodic and random, but carefully planned and well prepared. By Directive No. 39, he ordered his valiant troops to go on a defensive defense on the entire Eastern Front.
The reason for the failure of far-reaching plans was called the same legendary Russian winter, about which Napoleon could tell a lot of interesting things. Herr Adolf for some reason called her advance “premature”, citing difficulties in supply, which is why the battle of Moscow was unsuccessful. Only South Army Group was required to take offensive action, and even then if the weather was favorable. But in November of the 41st frost did not reach 6 degrees, it became cold only at the beginning of December (there was a 28-degree frost), but, as they say, the field is the same for everyone. And to talk about the prematureness of winter on December 5 is somehow not too correct.
In the valleys and on the hills
Meanwhile, the offensive continued, but its pace did not suit the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Then it was decided to pay less attention to the rearguards that fought, to bypass the retreating German units and to deliver surprise strikes in the rear. Mobile units, specially formed in a number of armies, significantly increased efficiency: the Red Army counter-offensive near Moscow became much more successful. Now they did not rest against each fortified position, but circumvented it and rushed forward, leaving the German rear guard in its own rear, where its fate was already a foregone conclusion.
For four days, from December 6 to 10, Soviet troops liberated nearly fifty settlements. Enemies threw many tanks, guns, cars and motorcycles, retreating.
On December 13, the Sovinformburo was finally able to say something pleasant to its citizens. The good news, of course, raised the morale of the Red Army and inspired hope for the civilian population of the country, which was watching its progress with bated breath.
A great success was the local victory near Kalinin, where the 31st Army managed to cut almost all the lines of communication for the Nazis. When the 30th Army of the Western Front came close to the river. Lame, the Germans left the city, fearing the environment.
Encouraged by the success, the Soviet troops gave in to the enemy so that the retreat turned into a stampede: almost all the equipment was in the hands of Soviet soldiers. On December 16, Kalinin already controlled the Red Army.
Local success in strategic victory
A month after the start of the offensive, on January 7, 1942, Kalinin Front’s formations came to Rzhev, Selizharovo and Zubtsov, occupying a strategically advantageous position north of the distressed German Center group.
Successful were the actions of the Western Front, which, overcoming the resistance, and sometimes very fierce, inexorably moved forward. On December 12, Solnechnogorsk was liberated, on the 15th - Klin, on the 20th - Volokolamsk.
The morale of the retreating units left much to be desired. Apparently, it was not in vain on December 16 that Hitler considered it necessary to supplement his own directive No. 39 with an order that ordered him to defend himself with "fanatical stubbornness," to hold on at all costs, etc.
Whether the order acted, or the Germans came to their senses, but they managed to gain a foothold on the natural boundary on the rivers Lame and Ruse. All attempts to overcome the resistance failed. The Red Army had to rest on our laurels and gain a foothold in their positions.
The partisans provided tremendous help, without which a victory near Moscow could have been much harder. They attacked the retreating Nazi units, destroyed German warehouses, carried out reconnaissance, extracting valuable information.
From the left wing of the army of the Western Front launched a large-scale offensive in the direction of Kaluga - the most important transport hub. It is clear that such an outcome did not suit the Germans. The command of the "Center" decided to gain a foothold on the Oka and hold the line at any cost, as, in fact, the beloved Fuhrer ordered.
Exemption from occupation
Zhukov perfectly understood how events would develop, so he ordered the pursuit of the enemy, not allowing him to rest and gain a foothold. In the course of the combat mission, the 49th Army, having overcome the resistance of the Nazis, occupied Tarusa on December 19. This was far from being successful right away - I even had to unexpectedly strike from the rear.
Meanwhile, the 50th Army was moving towards Kaluga. An advanced mobile detachment burst into the city on December 21, but the Germans weren’t bastardly sewn. Only nine days later, on December 30, Kaluga was liberated by the joint efforts of the 49th and 50th armies.
By January 8, Kozelsk, Belev, Meshchovsk and hundreds of other smaller settlements were liberated. Parts of the Red Army fearlessly crossed the Oka. The battle of Moscow (1942) was won. True, there were still years and years of war ahead.
The soldiers who fought in the armies of the Southwestern Front did not drop the honor of their uniforms. Ten days after the start of the operation, they advanced a hundred kilometers west and went ashore. Ksheni, capturing hundreds of units of enemy military equipment. Almost four hundred cities and villages (including Yelets and Efremov), got rid of the occupation.
Of course, the Germans were not going to give up. Nevertheless, they left Naro-Fominsk on December 26, Balabanovo on the 28th, Maloyaroslavets on January 2, and Borovsk on the 4th.
The outcome and significance of the battle
By January 8, 1942, the battle of Moscow, in short, was won, and won brilliantly. The troops reached the Selizharovo-Ruza-Mtsensk borders and drove the Germans an average of 200 km from Moscow. As a result of the operation, more than a thousand settlements were liberated, and the encirclement of Tula became impossible. During the month during which the battle near Moscow continued, the Germans suffered huge losses - almost two hundred thousand personnel (168 thousand only ground troops). 11 tank and more than twenty infantry divisions were defeated.
An important condition for success was good coordination of the three fronts and support from the aviation - here the command showed talent and excellent preparation.
It became extremely clear to Soviet soldiers that the rumors of the "invincibility" of the Hitlerite army, which had knocked almost all of Europe to its knees, were nothing more than a myth. That German tanks are “burning for a sweet soul,” and the soldiers are able to retreat with the same “laudable” swiftness.
Of course, it was very important that the enemy failed to capture the capital of the state. Moscow during the war (and not only) was not just a city, but also a symbol of the stability of the Soviet state.
The successes of the Soviet troops made the allies of the USSR become more active. Although the second front opened only in 1944, it is hardly fair to say that technical and other assistance was unnecessary.
Potential assistants to the Third Reich, Hitler’s defeat near Moscow, on the contrary, made him stand still: for example, some sources say that Turkey and Japan, if Moscow was captured, were ready to openly enter the war against the USSR. After the crushing fiasco that the Germans suffered, the cunning allies lurked, preferring to refrain from active actions.
The significance of the counterattack can hardly be overestimated: firstly, it was the first large-scale offensive operation of the Red Army. From a strategic and psychological point of view, this was a major breakthrough. Many military historians believe that it is precisely the battle of Moscow that can be briefly but succinctly called the “turning point of the war,” which predetermined its outcome. Millions of people on the continent finally got hope.
But most importantly, victory instilled faith in the hearts of the soldiers themselves. They finally saw that they really could resist the Germans. And not just to hold positions, but to regain lost territory.