After a radical military turn in 1943, all the prerequisites for convening a joint conference of the Big Three were formed. F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill have long called on the Soviet leader to hold such a meeting. The heads of the USA and Great Britain understood that the further successes of the Red Army would lead to a significant strengthening of the USSR’s position on the world stage. The opening of the second front was not only an act of help from the Allies, but also a means to maintain the influence of the United States and Great Britain. The increased authority of the USSR allowed Stalin to insist in a tougher form on the agreement of the Allies with his proposals.
On September 8, 1943, the Soviet leader agreed on the timing of the meeting with Churchill and Roosevelt. Stalin wanted the conference to be held in Tehran. He justified his choice by the fact that the city already had representative offices of leading powers. The Soviet leadership back in August sent representatives of state security agencies to Tehran, who were supposed to provide security at the conference. The Iranian capital was ideally suited for the Soviet leader. Leaving Moscow, he thereby made a friendly gesture towards the Western allies, but at the same time he could return to the USSR at any time. In October, the regiment of the NKVD border troops was moved to Tehran, which was engaged in patrolling and guarding the facilities associated with the upcoming conference.
Churchill approved the proposal of Moscow. Roosevelt was at first opposed, dissuading urgent matters, but in early November also agreed to Tehran. Stalin constantly mentioned that he could not leave the Soviet Union for a long time because of military necessity, so the conference should be held in a short time (November 27-30). Moreover, Stalin reserved the opportunity to leave the conference in case of any deterioration in the situation at the front.
Positions of the Allied Powers before the Conference
From the very beginning of the war, for Stalin, the main issue remained the Allied commitment to open a second front. The correspondence between Stalin and Churchill confirms that the Prime Minister of Great Britain invariably responded to the constant requests of the head of the USSR only with vague promises. The Soviet Union suffered heavy losses. Lend-lease supplies did not bring tangible help. The entry of the Allies into the war could greatly facilitate the position of the Red Army, divert part of the German troops and reduce losses. Stalin understood that after the defeat of Hitler, the Western powers would want to get their "share of the pie", therefore they were obliged to provide real military assistance. The Soviet government already in 1943 planned to take control of European territories right up to Berlin.
The positions of the United States as a whole were similar to the plans of the Soviet leadership. Roosevelt understood the significance of opening a second front (Operation Overlord). Successful landing in France allowed the United States to occupy the western German regions, as well as to introduce its military vessels in German, Norwegian and Danish ports. The president also hoped that the capture of Berlin would be carried out exclusively by the forces of the US Army.
Churchill was negative about the possible strengthening of the military influence of the USA and the USSR. He saw that Britain was gradually ceasing to play a leading role in world politics, giving way to the two superpowers. The Soviet Union, which was gaining military momentum, could no longer be stopped. But Churchill could still limit US influence. He sought to lower the significance of Operation Overlord and to focus on the actions of the British in Italy. The successful offensive on the Italian theater of operations allowed Britain to "penetrate" into Central Europe, cutting off the Soviet route to the west. To this end, Churchill vigorously promoted a plan for the landing of allied forces in the Balkans.
Organizational issues on the eve of the conference
On November 26, 1943, Stalin arrived in Tehran, and the next day, Churchill and Roosevelt. Even before the conference, the Soviet leadership managed to make an important tactical move. The Soviet and English embassies were nearby, while the American embassy was located at a considerable distance (about one and a half kilometers). This created problems for the security of the American president during the move. Soviet intelligence received information about the impending assassination attempt on members of the Big Three. The lead German saboteur, O. Skorzeny, supervised the preparation.
Stalin warned the American leader of a possible attempt. Roosevelt agreed to settle during the conference at the Soviet embassy, which allowed Stalin to conduct bilateral negotiations without Churchill's participation. Roosevelt was pleased and felt completely safe.
Tehran Conference: Date
The conference began its work on November 28 and officially closed on December 1, 1943. During this short period, several fruitful official and personal meetings took place between the heads of allied states, as well as between the chiefs of the general staffs. The Allies agreed that all negotiations would not be published, but this solemn promise was broken during the Cold War.
The Tehran conference was held in a rather unusual format. Its characteristic feature was the lack of an agenda. Participants of the meeting freely expressed their opinions and wishes, without following strict regulations. Briefly about the Tehran Conference of 1943, read on.
Question of the second front
The first meeting of the Tehran Conference of 1943 (briefly you have the opportunity to learn from the article) took place on November 28. Roosevelt voiced a report on the actions of American troops in the Pacific Ocean. The next point of the meeting was the discussion of the planned Operation Overlord. Stalin outlined the position of the Soviet Union. In his opinion, the actions of the allies in Italy are secondary and cannot seriously affect the general course of the war. The main forces of the Nazis are on the Eastern Front. Therefore, landing in northern France is becoming a priority for the Allies. This operation will force the German command to withdraw part of the troops from the Eastern Front. In this case, Stalin promised to support the allies with a new large-scale offensive by the Red Army.
Churchill was clearly opposed to Operation Overlord. Prior to the scheduled date of its holding (May 1, 1944), he proposed taking Rome and landing the Allied forces in Southern France and the Balkans ("from the soft underbelly of Europe"). The British Prime Minister said he was not sure that preparations for Operation Overlord would be completed by the due date.
Thus, at the Tehran Conference, the date of which you already knew, the main problem immediately emerged: the disagreements of the Allies on the opening of a second front.
The second day of the conference began with a meeting of the Allied chiefs of staff (Generals A. Brook, J. Marshall, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov). The discussion of the problem of the second front took on a sharper character. The representative of the US General Staff Marshall in his speech said that the operation "Overlord" is regarded by the United States as a priority. But the English General Brooke insisted on stepping up action in Italy and shied away from the issue of Overlord status.
A symbolic ceremony took place between the meeting of military representatives and the next meeting of leaders of the Union states: the donation of the honorary sword to the inhabitants of Stalingrad from King George VI. This ceremony defused the tense atmosphere and reminded everyone present about the need for coordinated action for a common purpose.
At the second meeting, Stalin took a tough stance. He directly asked the American president who is the commander of Operation Overlord. Having received no answer, Stalin realized that in fact the operation had not yet been completely prepared. Churchill again began to describe the benefits of military action in Italy. According to the memoirs of diplomat and translator V. M. Berezhkov, Stalin abruptly stood up and said: "... we have nothing to do here. We have a lot to do at the front." Roosevelt softened the conflict. He recognized the justice of Stalin's indignation and promised to agree with Churchill on the adoption of a decision that would suit everyone.
On November 30, a regular meeting of military representatives was held. Great Britain and the United States approved a new start date for Overlord — June 1, 1944. Roosevelt immediately informed Stalin about this. At an official meeting, this decision was finally approved and enshrined in the "Declaration of the Three Powers." The head of the Soviet state was completely satisfied. Foreign and Soviet observers emphasized that the solution to the question of opening a second front was the diplomatic victory of Stalin and Roosevelt over Churchill. Ultimately, this decision had a decisive influence on the entire course of the Second World War and the post-war structure.
Japanese question
The United States was extremely interested in launching military operations of the USSR against Japan. Stalin understood that in a personal meeting, Roosevelt would certainly raise this issue. It will depend on his decision whether the United States supports the plan for Operation Overlord. Already at the first meeting, Stalin confirmed his readiness to immediately begin military action against Japan after the unconditional surrender of Germany. Roosevelt was counting on more. He asked Stalin to provide intelligence data on Japan, he wanted to use the Soviet Far Eastern airfields and ports to accommodate American bombers and warships. But Stalin rejected these offers, limiting himself only to agreeing to declare war on Japan.
In any case, Roosevelt was satisfied with the decision of Stalin. The promise of the Soviet leadership played a large role in bringing the USSR and the US closer during the war.
Allied leaders recognized that all territories occupied by Japan should be returned to Korea and China.
Question of Turkey, Bulgaria and the Black Sea Straits
The issue of Turkey’s entry into the war against Germany worried Churchill most of all. The British Prime Minister hoped that this would divert attention from Operation Overlord and allow the British to increase their influence. The Americans were neutral, and Stalin was strongly opposed. As a result, the decisions of the conference regarding Turkey were vague. The question was postponed until the meeting of representatives of the Allies with Turkish President I. Inenu.
Great Britain and the USA were at war with Bulgaria. Stalin was in no hurry to declare war on Sofia. He hoped that during the German occupation, Bulgaria would turn to the USSR for help, which would allow Soviet troops to freely enter its territory. At the same time, Stalin promised the allies that he would declare war on Bulgaria if it attacked Turkey.
An important place was occupied by the issue of the Tehran Conference on the status of the Black Sea straits. Churchill insisted that Turkey’s neutral position in the war deprives her of the right to control the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. In fact, the British Prime Minister was afraid of the spread of Soviet influence in this zone. At the conference, Stalin really raised the issue of changing the regime of the straits and stated that the USSR, despite its enormous contribution to the common war, still had no way out of the Black Sea. The solution to this question was postponed for the future.
Questions about Yugoslavia and Finland
The USSR supported the resistance movement in Yugoslavia. The Western powers were guided by the emigrant royal government of Mikhailovich. But the members of the Big Three were still able to find a common language. The Soviet leadership announced the sending of a military mission to I. Tito, and the British promised to provide a base in Cairo to ensure communication with this mission. Thus, the Allies recognized the Yugoslav resistance movement.
For Stalin, the question of Finland was of great importance. The Finnish government has already made attempts to conclude peace with the Soviet Union, but these proposals did not suit Stalin. The Finns proposed accepting the 1939 border with small concessions. The Soviet government insisted on the recognition of the 1940 peace treaty, the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Finland, the complete demobilization of the Finnish army and compensation for the damage "at least half the size." Stalin also demanded the return of the port of Petsamo.
At the Tehran Conference of 1943, which is briefly discussed in the article, the Soviet leader softened the requirements. In return for Petsamo, he refused to rent the Hanko Peninsula. This was a serious concession. Churchill was sure that the Soviet government would at all costs maintain control of the peninsula, which was an ideal place for a Soviet military base. Stalin's voluntary gesture made a proper impression: the Allies declared that the USSR had every right to move the border with Finland to the west.
Question about the Baltic States and Poland
On December 1, a personal meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt took place. The American president said that he did not object to the occupation of the territories of the Baltic republics by Soviet troops. But at the same time, Roosevelt noted that it is necessary to reckon with the public opinion of the population of the Baltic republics. In a written response, Stalin sharply expressed his position: "... the question ... is not subject to discussion, since the Baltic states are part of the USSR." Churchill and Roosevelt had only to admit their powerlessness in this situation.
Regarding future borders and the status of Poland, there were no particular disagreements. Even during the Moscow conference, Stalin categorically refused to establish contacts with the Polish emigrant government. The three leaders agreed that the future structure of Poland entirely depends on their decision. Poland is time to say goodbye to claims for the role of a great country and become a small state.
After a joint discussion, the "Tehran Formula" of the British Prime Minister was adopted. The core of ethnographic Poland should be located between the Curzon line (1939) and the Oder River. The structure of Poland included East Prussia and Oppeln province. This decision was based on Churchill’s proposal for the “three matches”, namely that the borders of the USSR, Poland and Germany were simultaneously moving west.
Quite unexpected for Churchill and Roosevelt was Stalin's demand for the transfer of Koenigsberg to the Soviet Union. Since the end of 1941, the Soviet leadership hatched these plans, justifying them with the fact that "the Russians do not have ice-free ports on the Baltic Sea." Churchill did not object, but hoped that in the future he would be able to defend Koenigsberg for the Poles.
Question about France
Stalin openly expressed his negative attitude towards Vichy France. The existing government supported and acted as an ally of the Nazis, so it was obliged to bear the deserved punishment. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership was ready to cooperate with the French Committee for National Liberation. C. de Gaulle proposed to Stalin very ambitious plans for the joint management of post-war Europe, but they did not find a response from the Soviet leader. The Allies did not at all consider France as a leading power having equal rights with them.
A special place at the conference was occupied by a discussion of French colonial possessions. The Allies agreed that France would have to abandon its colonies. At the same time, the Soviet Union continued its struggle against colonialism as a whole. Roosevelt supported Stalin, since Great Britain wanted to take over French Indochina.
Question of the post-war structure of Germany
For Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, the idea of the mandatory dismemberment of Germany was common. This measure was to suppress any possible attempt to revive "Prussian militarism and Nazi tyranny." Roosevelt planned the division of Germany into several independent small states. Churchill was more restrained, because the excessive fragmentation of Germany could create difficulties for the post-war economy. Stalin simply declared the need for dismemberment, but did not voice his plans.
As a result, at the Tehran Conference (year 1943), only the general principles of the post-war system of Germany were approved. Practical measures were delayed for the future.
Other decisions of the Tehran Conference
One of the secondary issues was the discussion of creating an international organization that could maintain security around the world. The initiator of this issue was Roosevelt, who proposed his plan for creating such an organization.One of the points suggested the formation of the Police Committee (USSR, USA, UK and China). Stalin, in principle, did not mind, but pointed out that it was necessary to create two organizations (European and Far Eastern or European and world). Churchill was of the same opinion.
Another outcome of the Tehran Conference was the adoption of the "Declaration of the Three Great Powers on Iran." It recognized the independence and sovereignty of Iran. The allies confirmed that Iran provided invaluable assistance in the war and promised to provide economic assistance to the country.
Stalin's skillful tactical step was his personal visit to the Iranian Shah R. Pahlavi. The head of Iran was bewildered and considered this visit a great honor for himself. Stalin promised to help Iran strengthen its military forces. Thus, the Soviet Union acquired a faithful and reliable ally.
Conference Summary
Even foreign observers stated that the Tehran Conference was a brilliant diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union. I. Stalin showed outstanding diplomatic qualities to "push through" the necessary decisions. The main goal of the Soviet leader was achieved. The Allies agreed on the date of Operation Overlord.
At the conference, the rapprochement of the positions of the USA and the USSR on major issues was outlined. Churchill often found himself alone and was forced to accept the proposals of Stalin and Roosevelt.
Stalin skillfully used the tactics of "carrot and stick". His peremptory statements (the fate of the Baltic republics, the transfer of Koenigsberg, etc.) he softened with some concessions to the Western powers. This allowed Stalin to achieve profitable decisions at the Tehran Conference on the post-war borders of the USSR. They played a huge role in history.
The result of the Tehran Conference was that for the first time the general principles of a post-war world order were worked out. Great Britain recognized that the leading role is shifting to the two superpowers. The United States strengthened its influence in Western, and the Soviet Union in Eastern and Central Europe. It became clear that after the war, the collapse of the former colonial empires, primarily Britain.
Essence
What is the essence of the Tehran Conference? She contained a huge ideological meaning. The conference held in 1943 confirmed that countries with different political systems and mutually exclusive ideologies are quite capable of reaching agreement on the most important issues. Close alliances were established between the allies . Of particular importance was a clearer coordination of warfare and mutual assistance.
For millions of people around the world, the conference has become a symbol of the inevitable victory over the enemy. Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt set an example of how mutual disagreements can easily be overcome under the influence of a common mortal danger. Many historians consider the conference to be the zenith of the anti-Hitler coalition.
At the Tehran conference, which we briefly discussed in the article, the leaders of the Big Three came together for the first time. Successful cooperation continued in 1945 in Yalta and Potsdam. Two more conferences took place. The Potsdam, Tehran and Yalta conferences laid the foundations for a future world order. As a result of the agreements, the UN was created, which, even in the conditions of the Cold War, to some extent sought to maintain peace on the planet.