Colonel Starinov, a subversive subversive, proposed conducting large-scale partisan operations on the enemy’s railway lines. His ideas found support from the head of TsSHPD (Central Headquarters for the Partisan Movement), Lieutenant General Ponomarenko, who presented them to Stalin and received approval for their implementation.
Large-scale guerrilla sabotage was called Operation Rail War. It was decided to conduct it before the most important strategic battle on the Kursk Bulge. On the eve of this battle, the balance of power of the opponents was approximately equal. The outcome of the battle to a large extent depended on how successfully the maneuver of the troops was carried out, reserves were used and, most importantly, conditions were provided for supplying the army with everything necessary.
"Rail War" - it was a prepared event. In training centers and partisan schools, the number of trained demolition specialists and instructors has increased.
To disable the entire railway infrastructure of the enemy on the scale on which it was planned, required a huge number of fuses and the most explosives, which the partisans did not have. The supply of units was carried out using long-range aviation forces.
The Rail War was planned for implementation at the front, the length of which was a thousand kilometers from north to south and seven hundred and fifty kilometers from west to east inland. The diversion was supposed to be in three stages, each of which was supposed to last fifteen to thirty days.
The Rail War began in 1943, on August 3rd. Seventy-four thousand partisans simultaneously hit the enemy’s communications.
Ponomarenko, using the ideas of Starinov, subsequently developed his own plan for subversive activities. Ponomarenko believed that risky attacks on enemy echelons were inappropriate. In his opinion, it was enough to deliver targeted strikes on the railway itself, undermining the rails with the help of small charges. Thus, it was planned to create a shortage of railroad tracks among the Germans and a collapse of the transport system before the Battle of Kursk.
Starinov, in turn, defended his point of view, arguing that it was the echelons of the enemy that had a strategic purpose. Moreover, the destroyed rails are quite simple to restore in comparison with the compensation for damage from the collapse of the train. This would lead to much more massive destruction and interruptions in movement.
As a result, Starinov was sent to the Ukrainian headquarters, and Ponomarenko continued to implement his plan.
Not without traditional Soviet formalism. Ponomarenko established for the partisan detachments a certain plan for the number of blown up rails. It should be noted that this approach did more harm. The order mentioned the undermining of not only the main, but also the spare, as well as poorly or not at all guarded routes. As a result, many commanders chose to explode insignificant paths, unexploited branches.
At the same time, the Germans quickly enough learned to repair "point injuries," which, I must say, were usually no more than 30-35 centimeters. They invented the "rail bridge", which was superimposed on the destroyed site. The Hitlerites compensated for the lack of canvas from the rarely used Belgian, Dutch branches.
Thus, the Rail War at the first stage, according to various estimates, caused more damage to the Red Army itself than to the Germans.
During the second and third stages, the leadership of the partisan movement took into account errors. This time, not single “point” blasts were carried out, but rails on large sections were blown up, and railroad ties were destroyed. In December 1943, the third stage was completed.
Despite the mistakes made, the Rail War made it possible to reduce the main cargo flow from Europe to the East by more than 30%.