After Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, the course of the Great Patriotic War was finally broken, the Red Army began to conquer its land. The Second World War was nearing its end. The liberation of Belarus was an important stage on the road to victory.
Winter attempt
The first attempt to liberate Belarus was made in the winter of 1944. The offensive in the direction of Vitebsk began in early February, but it was not crowned with success: the advance was difficult, in a month and a half it was possible to go deep only ten kilometers.
The Belarusian front, operating in the Minsk-Bobruisk direction, was doing slightly better, but also far from brilliantly. Then the offensive began even earlier, in early January, and already on the 14th Mozyr and Kalinkovichi were taken. By the beginning of spring, Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper and captured 20-25 km of territory from the Nazis.
Such a leisurely advance of the Red Army could not be considered particularly successful, therefore, in mid-spring, the High Command decided to postpone the offensive. The troops were ordered to gain a foothold in their positions and wait for better times.
Unlike the Belarusian direction, the large-scale campaign of the winter-spring of 1944 was quite successful: the southern edge of the front crossed the border, the battles were fought outside the USSR. Things were going well on the northern sector of the front: Soviet troops were able to get Finland out of the war. For the summer it was planned the liberation of Belarus, the Baltic republics and the complete conquest of Ukraine.
Disposition
The front line in the BSSR was an 1100 km long arc (ledge, wedge) directed towards the Soviet Union. In the north, it was limited to Vitebsk, in the south - to Pinsk. Inside this arc, called the "Belarusian ledge" in the Soviet General Staff, German troops were stationed - the Center group, which included the 3rd Panzer, 2nd, 4th and 9th armies.
The German command attached great strategic importance to its positions in Belarus. They were ordered to protect at all costs, so the liberation of Belarus was not at all an easy walk.
Moreover, in the spring of 1944 the Führer did not consider the war to be lost at all, but he rejoiced himself with hopes, believing that if you take time, the coalition would fall apart, and there the Soviet Union would surrender, exhausted by a long war.
After conducting a series of reconnaissance operations and analyzing the situation, the Wehrmacht decided that Ukraine and Romania should wait for troubles rather: using the already conquered territory, the Red Army could inflict a crushing blow and even recapture the strategically important Ploiesti deposits from Germany.
Guided by these considerations, the Nazis pulled the main forces to the south, believing that the liberation of Belarus was unlikely to begin so soon: neither the state of the enemy forces, nor local conditions were in the least ready for the offensive.
Military trick
The USSR carefully supported these false beliefs in the enemy. Fake defensive lines were built on the central site, the 3rd Ukrainian Front intensely imitated the movement of a dozen rifle divisions, the illusion was created that the tank formations deployed in Ukraine remained in place, while in reality they were hastily deployed to the central part of the offensive line . Numerous fraudulent manipulations were carried out, designed to falsely inform the enemy, and meanwhile, Operation Bagration was being prepared in the strictest confidence: the liberation of Belarus was just around the corner.
On May 20, the General Staff completed the planning of the campaign. As a result, the Soviet command hoped to achieve the following goals:
- move the enemy away from Moscow;
- wedge between groups of Nazi armies and deprive them of communication with each other;
- provide a bridgehead for subsequent strikes against the enemy.
To achieve success, the Belarusian offensive operation was carefully planned, because a lot depended on its outcome: the victory opened the way to Warsaw, and hence to Berlin. The fight was serious, because to achieve the goals it was necessary:
- overcome a powerful system of enemy fortifications
- to force large rivers;
- take strategically important positions;
- in the shortest possible time free Minsk from the Nazis.
Approved plan
On May 22 and 23, the plan was discussed with the participation of the front commanders who took part in the operation, and on May 30 it was finally approved. According to him, it was supposed:
- “Perforate” the German defenses in six places, taking advantage of the surprise of the attack and the power of the blow;
- to destroy the groups near Vitebsk and Bobruisk, which served as a kind of "wings" of the Belarusian ledge;
- after the breakthrough, move forward along a converging trajectory in order to encircle as many enemy forces as possible.
The successful implementation of the plan actually put an end to the forces of the Wehrmacht in this sector and made possible the complete liberation of Belarus: 1944 was supposed to put an end to the torment of the population, which had fully absorbed the horrors of the war.
The main participants in the events
The forces of the Dnieper military flotilla and four fronts took part in the largest offensive operation: the 1st Baltic and three Byelorussian.
It is difficult to overestimate the huge role that partisan detachments played in the operation: without their developed movement, the liberation of Belarus from Nazi invaders would certainly have taken much more time and effort. During the so-called rail war, the partisans managed to blow up almost 150 thousand rails. This, of course, greatly complicated the life of the invaders, and yet the trains were derailed, crossings were destroyed, communications were deteriorated, and many other impudent sabotages were committed. The partisan movement in Belarus was the most powerful in the USSR.
When the Bagration operation was being developed, the mission of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Rokossovsky was considered especially difficult. In the area of the Bobruisk direction, nature itself did not seem to be conducive to success - in this matter the high command of both sides was completely unanimous. Indeed, to advance using tanks through impassable swamps is, to put it mildly, a difficult task. But the marshal insisted: the Germans did not expect an attack from this side, since the existence of the swamps was no worse than ours. That is why the blow must be dealt precisely from here.
Balance of power
The fronts participating in the campaign were significantly strengthened. The railway did not work for fear, but for conscience: in the course of preparation, a myriad of equipment and people was transported - all with the strictest secrecy.
Since the Germans decided to concentrate their forces in the southern sector, the German Army Group Center opposing the Red Army numbered several times less people. Against 36.4 thousand Soviet guns and mortars - 9.5 thousand, against 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns - 900 tanks and assault guns, against 5.3 thousand units of military aviation - 1350 aircraft.
The start time of the operation was kept in the strictest confidence. Until the very last moment, the Germans did not have the slightest idea about the upcoming campaign. One can imagine the commotion that arose when Operation Bagration finally began in the early morning of June 23.
Surprise for the Fuhrer
The advance of fronts and armies was not uniform. For example, the striking force of the 1st Baltic (4th Army) was not able to crush the enemy with one frantic onslaught. During the day of the operation, she was able to overcome only 5 km. But the Sixth Guards and Forty-third armies of fortune smiled: they "pierced" the enemy’s defenses and went around Vitebsk from the north-west. The Germans hastily retreated, leaving about 15 km. The tanks of the 1st Corps immediately poured into the gap.
The 3rd Belorussian Front, by forces of the 39th and 5th armies, bypassed Vitebsk from the south, practically did not notice the Luchesa River and continued the offensive. The boiler closed: on the first day of the operation, the Germans had only one chance to avoid being surrounded: a twenty-kilometer-wide “corridor” that did not last long, the trap closed in the village of Ostrovno.
At first, failure in the Orsha direction of the Soviet soldiers awaited: the German defense in this sector was very powerful, the enemy was desperate, evil, and defensively defending himself. Attempts to free Orsha were made back in January and failed. In winter, the battle was lost, but the war was not lost: Operation Bagration did not leave room for failure.
The 11th and 31st armies spent all day trying to break through to the second line of German defense. Meanwhile, the 5th Panzer Army was waiting in the wings: in the event of a successful breakthrough in the Orsha direction, it would open the way to Minsk.
The 2nd Belorussian Front steadily and successfully attacked Mogilev. By the end of the first day of fighting, in the framework of the campaign on the banks of the Dnieper, they managed to capture a good bridgehead.
On June 24, the operation to liberate Belarus began for the 1st Belorussian Front, which began to carry out its own combat mission: to move in the Bobruisk direction. Here the hopes for the surprise of the attack were fully justified: still, from this side the Germans did not expect trouble in any way. Their line of defense was scattered and small.
In the Parichi area, only the strike group broke through 20 km - the tanks of the First Guards Corps immediately crawled into the gap. The Germans retreated to Bobruisk. Pursuing them, the avant-garde was already on June 25 at the approaches to the city.
At first, things were not so rosy in the Rogachev region: the enemy fiercely resisted, but when the direction of the blow was rejected to the north, things went more fun. On the third day after the start of the Soviet operation, the Germans realized that it was time to escape, but they were late: the Soviet tanks were already deep behind enemy lines. On June 27, the trap slammed shut. It turned out to be more than six enemy divisions, which two days later were completely destroyed.
Success
The offensive was swift. On June 26, the Red Army liberated Vitebsk, on the 27th after fierce fighting, the Nazis nevertheless left Orshansk, on the 28th, Soviet tanks were already in Borisov, which was completely cleared on July 1.
Near Minsk, Vitebsk and Bobruisk, 30 enemy divisions were killed. 12 days after the start of the operation, Soviet troops advanced 225-280 km, breaking one half of Belarus in one jerk.
The Wehrmacht was completely unprepared for such a development of events, and the command of the Army Group Center itself was grossly and systematically mistaken. The time count went on hours, and sometimes on minutes. At first it was still possible to avoid the environment by stepping back to the river in time. Berezina and creating a new line of defense here. It is unlikely that in this case the liberation of Belarus would have been realized in two months. But Field Marshal Bush did not give the order on time. Either his belief in the infallibility of Hitler’s military calculations was so strong, or the commander underestimated the enemy’s strength, but he fanatically followed Hitler’s order “to defend the Belorussian ledge at all costs” and ruined his troops. 40 thousand soldiers and officers, as well as 11 German generals who held high posts, were captured. The result, frankly, is shameful.
Shocked by the success of the enemy, the Germans began feverishly correcting the situation: Bush was removed from his post, and additional formations began to be pulled into Belarus. Seeing the trends, the Soviet command demanded to accelerate the offensive and occupy Minsk no later than July 8. The plan was overfulfilled: on the 3rd of the day, the capital of the republic was liberated, and large German forces (105 thousand soldiers and officers) to the east of the city were surrounded. The last country that many of them saw in their lives was Belarus. 1944 gathered its bloody harvest: 70 thousand people were killed and about 35 thousand were to go through the streets of the jubilant Soviet capital. The enemy’s front gaped, there was nothing to eliminate the huge 400-kilometer gap. The Germans took flight.
Two stages of the operation
Operation Bagration consisted of two phases. The first began on June 23. At this time, it was necessary to break through the strategic front of the enemy, to destroy the flanking forces of the Belorussian ledge. The attacks of the fronts should, gradually converging, concentrate at one point on the map. After achieving success, the tasks changed: it was urgent to ensure the pursuit of the enemy and the expansion of the breakthrough line. On July 4, the General Staff of the USSR changed the initial plan, thereby completing the first stage of the campaign.
Instead of converging paths, diverging ones were coming: the 1st Baltic Front moved in the direction of Šiauliai, the 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to free Vilnius and Lida, the 2nd Belorussian Front was Novogrudok, Grodno and Bialystok. Rokossovsky went in the direction of Baranavichy and Brest, and taking the latter, went to Lublin.
The second phase of Operation Bagration began on July 5. Soviet troops continued their rapid advance. By mid-summer, the vanguards of the fronts began to force the Neman. Large bridgeheads were captured on the Vistula and p. Narew. On July 16, the Red Army occupied Grodno, and on 28, Brest.
On August 29, the operation was completed. There were new steps to victory.
Strategic importance
In its scope, Bagration is one of the largest strategic offensive campaigns. In just 68 days, Belarus was liberated. 1944, indeed, put an end to the occupation of the republic. The Baltic territories were partially recaptured, Soviet troops crossed the border and partially occupied Poland.
The defeat of the powerful Army Group Center was a great military and strategic success. 3 brigades and 17 enemy divisions were completely destroyed. 50 divisions lost more than half of their composition. The troops of the USSR reached East Prussia - the archival German outpost.
The outcome of the operation contributed to the successful offensive in other areas, as well as the opening of a second front.
During the operation, the Germans lost about half a million people (killed, wounded and prisoners). The USSR also suffered serious losses at a rate of 765,815 people (178,507 killed, 587,308 injured). Soviet soldiers showed miracles of heroism in order for the liberation of Belarus. The year of the operation, however, like the entire period of the Patriotic War, was the time of a true feat of arms. There are many memorials and monuments in the republic. On the 21st kilometer of the Moscow highway, the Mound of Glory was erected . The monument crowning the embankment is four bayonets, symbolizing the four fronts that carried out the campaign.
The significance of this local victory was so great that the Soviet government was going to establish a medal for the liberation of Belarus, but subsequently this never happened. Some award sketches are kept in the Minsk Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War.