The official Soviet historiography called the battle near Prokhorovka legendary. A battle broke out on the battlefield, which was recognized as the greatest tank battle in history, without specifying, however, the number of armored vehicles participating in it.
For a long time, the main source of information about this episode of the war was the book of the Battle of Kursk by I. Markin, published in 1953. Then, already in the seventies, the epic "Liberation" was shot, one of the series of which was dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. And its main part was the battle of Prokhorovka. Without exaggeration, it can be argued that Soviet people studied the history of the war from these works of art. For the first ten years there was no information at all about the world's greatest tank battle.
Legendary means mythical. These words are synonyms. Historians are forced to turn to myths when other sources are not available. The battle near Prokhorovka occurred not in Old Testament times, but in 1943. The unwillingness of the honored military leaders to tell the details of events that are so distant in time is evidence of the tactical, strategic, or other miscalculations they made.
In the early summer of 1943, in the area of the city of Kursk, the front line was formed so that an arched protrusion formed deep into the German defense. The German General Staff of the ground forces reacted to this situation quite stereotypically. Their task was to cut off, surround, and subsequently defeat the Soviet group, consisting of the Central and Voronezh fronts. According to the Citadel plan, the Germans were going to strike in the direction from Orel and Belgorod.
The enemy’s intentions were unraveled. The Soviet command took measures to prevent a breakthrough in defense and prepared a retaliatory strike, which was to follow after exhausting the advancing German troops. Both warring parties moved armored forces to implement their plans.
It is reliably known that on July 10, the second SS Panzer Corps , under the command of the Gruppenführer Paul Hausser, collided with units of the Fifth Panzer Army, Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov, preparing for the offensive. The confrontation arose lasted almost a week. Its climax came on July 12th.
What is true in this information, but what is fiction?
Apparently, the battle of Prokhorovka came as a surprise, both for the Soviet and German command. Tanks are used for the offensive, their main function is to support infantry and overcome defense lines. The number of Soviet armored vehicles was superior to the enemy, so at first glance the Germans counter-battle was unprofitable. However, the enemy skillfully took advantage of the successful terrain, which allowed firing from long distances. Soviet T-34-75 tanks, which had an advantage in maneuver, were inferior to the Tigers in tower armaments. In addition, every third Soviet machine in this battle was a light reconnaissance T-70.
The surprise factor was also important, the Germans had earlier discovered the enemy, and were the first to launch an attack. Their best coordination was due to well-organized radio communications.
In such difficult conditions, the battle of Prokhorovka began. The losses were huge, and their ratio was not in favor of the Soviet troops.
According to the plan of the commander of the Voronezh Front, Vatutin and member of the military council Khrushchev, the result of the counterattack was to be the defeat of a German group trying to make a breakthrough. This did not happen, and the operation was declared failed. However, it later became clear that the benefit from it was still, and enormous. The Wehrmacht suffered catastrophic losses, the German command lost the initiative, and the offensive plan was disrupted, albeit at the cost of a lot of blood. Then a retrospective plan of the battle of Prokhorovka appeared, and the operation was declared a major military success.
So, the official description of these events near Kursk is based on three myths:
Myth One: A pre-conceived operation. Although this was not so. The battle was due to lack of awareness of the enemy’s plans.
Myth two: the main cause of the loss of tanks by the parties was the oncoming battle. This was not so either. Most of the armored vehicles, both German and Soviet, were hit by anti-tank artillery.
The third myth: the battle took place continuously and on one field - Prokhorovsky. And that was not so. The battle consisted of many individual combat episodes, from July 10-17, 1943.